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ABSTRACT 
This Article offers a new justification for modern litigation under the 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a provision from the 1789 Judiciary Act that 
permits victims of human rights violations anywhere in the world to sue 
tortfeasors in U.S. courts. The ATS, moribund for nearly 200 years, has 
recently emerged as an important but controversial tool for the 
enforcement of human rights norms. “Realist” critics contend that ATS 
litigation exasperates U.S. allies and rivals, weakens efforts to combat 
terrorism, and threatens U.S. sovereignty by importing into our 
jurisprudence undemocratic international law norms. Defenders of the 
statute, largely because they do not share the critics‟ realist assumptions 
about international relations, have so far declined to engage with the 
cost-benefit critique of ATS litigation and instead justify the ATS as a key 
component in a global human rights regime. 
This Article addresses the realists‟ critique on its own terms, offering 
the first defense of ATS litigation that is itself rooted in realism—the view 
that nations are unitary, rational actors pursuing their security in an 
anarchic world and obeying international law only when it suits their 
interests. In particular, this Article identifies three flaws in the current 
realist ATS critique. First, critics rely on speculation about catastrophic 
future costs without giving sufficient weight to the actual history of ATS 
litigation and to the prudential and substantive limits courts have already 
imposed on it. Second, critics‟ fears about the sovereignty costs that will 
arise when federal courts incorporate international-law norms into 
domestic law are overblown because U.S. law already reflects the limited 
set of universal norms, such as torture and genocide, that are actionable 
under the ATS. Finally, this realist critique fails to overcome the 
incoherence created by contending that the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
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courts may harm U.S. interests while also assuming that nations are 
unitary, rational actors.  
Moving beyond the current realist ATS critique, this Article offers a 
new, positive realist argument for ATS litigation. This Article suggests 
that, in practice, the U.S. government as a whole pursues its security and 
economic interests in ATS litigation by signaling cooperativeness through 
respect for human rights while also ensuring that the law is developed on 
U.S. terms. This realist understanding, offered here for the first time, both 
explains the persistence of ATS litigation and bridges the gap that has 
frustrated efforts to weigh the ATS‟s true costs and benefits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has fascinated scholars since the Second 
Circuit roused it from a 200-year-old slumber in 1980, holding that it 
enabled Paraguayans to sue their own government officials in United 
States courts for torture committed in Paraguay.
1
 This once-obscure 
provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act—giving federal courts jurisdiction 
over civil actions ―for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations‖—has become a unique vehicle for global human rights litigation.2  
Modern ATS litigation has inspired a sharp debate, which continues to 
rage about both its historical pedigree and the status of customary 
international law (CIL) as federal common law.
3
 But doctrine and history 
aside, the ATS‘s critics have also issued increasingly dire warnings about 
its strategic costs for the United States. Critics contend that ATS litigation 
irritates both allies and rivals, weakens efforts to combat terrorism, and 
threatens U.S. sovereignty through the importation of undemocratic norms 
developed by human rights groups, elite academics, and U.N. bureaucrats.
4
 
 
 
 1. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1980). Although the acts alleged 
were committed in Paraguay three years earlier, personal jurisdiction existed over the defendant, a 
former police official, because he was living illegally in Brooklyn when the suit was filed. See id. at 
878–79, 885. For a detailed discussion of Filartiga and a comprehensive history of ATS litigation, see 
JEFFREY DAVIS, JUSTICE ACROSS BORDERS: THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S. COURTS 
(2008). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The current version reads in full: ―The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.‖ Id. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human 
Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 457, 473 (2001) [hereinafter Bradley, Costs] (observing that 
international human rights litigation is uniquely concentrated in U.S. courts because of the ATS). In 
1993, Belgium enacted a statute providing universal jurisdiction for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide, but it was scaled back enormously a decade later. See Steven R. Ratner, 
Belgium‟s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 888, 889–91 (2003).  
 3. CIL consists of norms that arise from state practices and a sense of obligation rather than 
treaties. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) 
(1987). The doctrinal and historical debate over modern ATS litigation began when self-styled 
―revisionists‖ launched a bracing critique of the ―modern position‖ that CIL is generally part of the 
federal common law enforceable by U.S. courts through, among other mechanisms, the ATS. See, e.g., 
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A 
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 816–17 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & 
Goldsmith, Modern Position]. In 2004, the Supreme Court permitted ATS litigation to continue, but 
was vague enough so that both sides believed they had won. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 
692, 712 (2004) (interpreting the ATS as a jurisdictional statute that nonetheless makes actionable 
violations of a limited set of CIL norms). For more on revisionism and the modern position, see infra 
notes 60–78 and accompanying text. For a summary of the debate regarding the ATS‘s original 
purpose and current status, see, for example, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, 
Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 
(2007). 
 4. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE 
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In 2003, the ATS was likened to an ―awakening monster‖ threatening to 
cause, among other things, a 10% drop in U.S. global trade.
5
 
The ATS‘s defenders have disputed some of these arguments, but they 
have engaged the cost-benefit critique only sporadically and 
incompletely.
6
 They focus instead on the ATS‘s role in advancing a global 
human rights regime.
7
 As a result, much of the cost-benefit critique has 
gone unanswered. This Article is the first to articulate a rational-choice 
defense of ATS litigation that fully addresses its strategic costs and 
benefits for the United States.  
Critics and defenders of ATS litigation start with radically different 
assumptions about international relations (IR). The critique of ATS 
litigation is, for the most part, grounded in realism—the influential view 
that the global system is anarchic, populated solely by unitary 
 
 
ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 14 (2003) (predicting that expanding ATS litigation against 
corporations will cause severe disruption to the U.S. and global economies); Daniel Abebe, Not Just 
Doctrine: The True Motivation for Federal Incorporation and International Human Rights Litigation, 
29 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 1 (2007) (using international relations realism to argue for greater judicial 
deference to executive-branch views in ATS cases); Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 460–70 
(discussing foreign policy and sovereignty costs for the U.S. and global community from ATS 
litigation); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to 
the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 154–55 (2004) [hereinafter, Ku & Yoo, Beyond 
Formalism] (concluding that a functional analysis of the ATS reveals that the costs of ATS litigation 
in federal courts outweigh its benefits); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, The Political Economy of 
Customary International Law and the Alien Tort Claims Statute (April 29–30, 2010) [hereinafter 
McGinnis & Somin, Political Economy] (transcript available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
searlecenter/papers/McGinnis_ATS.pdf) (discussing sovereignty, foreign policy, and economic costs 
for the United States from ATS litigation); Mark E. Rosen, The Alien Tort Statute: An Emerging 
Threat to National Security (2003), http://www.nftc.org/default/usa%20engage/ATS%20-%20An%20 
Emerging%20Threat%20to%20National%20Security.pdf (contending that ATS lawsuits against 
private military contractors will interfere with the pursuit of U.S. national security policy). 
 5. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 4, at 26, 38 (predicting that billion-dollar awards in 
ATS lawsuits will prompt massive disinvestment by U.S. multinational corporations from target 
countries, causing at least a 10% drop in U.S. global trade). 
 6. See, e.g., HARRY AKOH, HOW A COUNTRY TREATS ITS CITIZENS NO LONGER EXCLUSIVE 
DOMESTIC CONCERN: A HISTORY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE LITIGATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED IN AFRICA 1980–2008, at 312 (2009) (concluding that 
ATS litigation in Africa has had a positive effect on human rights in the target countries, advancing the 
stated U.S. foreign policy of promoting human rights abroad); Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort 
Statute, Civil Society, and Corporate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 971, 971 (2004) (arguing 
that ATS litigation does not harm U.S. foreign relations, nor America‘s ―standing as an international 
leader in the promotion and protection of human rights‖); Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of 
Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive 
Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 209–10 (2008) (rejecting the U.S. government‘s argument 
that ATS litigation harms efforts at democratic reform and thwarts the U.S. foreign policy goal of 
respecting human rights). In addition, Sarah Cleveland focuses on human rights benefits and stresses 
the courts‘ procedural and prudential mechanisms for limiting ATS litigation that might interfere with 
the conduct of foreign relations. See Cleveland, supra, at 981–82.  
 7. See infra notes 114–26 and accompanying text. 
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nation-states, and shaped by a small set of great powers balancing one 
another.
8
 For the pure realist, the international system is a set of ―billiard 
balls colliding.‖9 Realists argue that nations comply with international law 
only when it serves their core interests of protecting their security and 
sovereignty.
10
 
Drawing on realism, critics conclude that ATS litigation is inefficient 
and welfare-negative for the United States. For example, they argue that a 
controversial ATS lawsuit against multinational corporations for aiding 
and abetting apartheid-era abuses in South Africa punishes companies 
with ties to the United States, leading to the loss of investment.
11
 Such 
suits are said to provoke a backlash against the United States in affected 
countries and antagonize its allies whose multinationals are being sued.
12
 
Critics contend that U.S. courts, meanwhile, may use the ATS to import 
into U.S. law ―raw‖ international law norms that have not been approved 
by the democratic process through legislation or treaty making, weakening 
U.S. sovereignty.
13
  
In contrast, ATS defenders eschew IR realism and instead assume that 
geopolitics can be influenced by international law independent of state 
interests, that regime type matters, and that legal enforcement of human 
rights norms can cause them to be internalized in nations.
14
 These 
 
 
 8. Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in 
NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 158, 158 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986). 
 9. Daniel H. Nexon & Thomas Wright, What‟s at Stake in the American Empire Debate, 101 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 253, 256 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing realism in the 
context of the American empire debate). 
 10. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 17–21; infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. For a 
discussion of realism, see infra notes 99–114 and accompanying text. For a discussion of realism‘s 
impact on U.S. foreign affairs law more generally, see Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the 
Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 95–102 (2009). 
 11. See In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff‟d in part, 
vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat‘l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 
2007), aff‟d without opinion sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) 
(affirming by default for lack of quorum). The Bush administration urged that the suits be dismissed, 
citing, in part, these economic concerns. See infra notes 234–40 and accompanying text. A divided 
panel of the Second Circuit recently held that the ATS does not provide jurisdiction for lawsuits 
against corporations, stopping the South Africa litigation and perhaps signaling the future demise of all 
ATS lawsuits against corporations. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
 12. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 32–35. 
 13. See id. at 14–15; Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 464–69; John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, 
Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2007) (describing 
international law not endorsed by the domestic political process as ―raw international law‖).  
 14. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 6, at 984–85; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal 
Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 199 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, Transnational Process]; Christiana 
Ochoa, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of International Law: Identifying and Defining CIL Post Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 105, 108–09 (2005).  
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assumptions partake of alternatives to realism in IR theory, including 
liberalism and constructivism.
15
 For its defenders, ATS litigation 
contributes to a global human rights regime that can substantially 
influence nations‘ behaviors.16 The South African apartheid litigation, for 
example, is said to demonstrate to the world that no one can escape justice 
for human rights violations.
17
 ATS litigation is, for its defenders, one way 
that international society can strengthen the rule of law and improve 
governments‘ human rights practices.18  
With critics and defenders largely talking past one another, it has 
seemed that views of international relations dictate one‘s views of the 
ATS. But this need not be true. Realist assumptions need not lead one to 
reject ATS litigation. This Article separates assumptions from their 
conventional conclusions and offers a defense of ATS litigation from a 
realist perspective. In doing so, it supplies missing common ground for 
further empirical studies about the costs and benefits of ATS litigation. 
The project that this Article begins is especially important because 
historical materials on the ATS are quite thin, and the relationship between 
CIL and federal common law is especially murky.
19
 Because the debate 
about doctrine and history remains stalemated, cost-benefit analysis takes 
on greater significance.
20
  
An evaluation of the realist, cost-benefit ATS critique on its own terms 
reveals three major flaws. First, it is internally inconsistent. Realism holds 
that nations are unitary, rational actors pursuing their interests.
21
 But 
critics posit that U.S. courts‘ enforcement of the ATS harms U.S. interests. 
In doing so, critics prematurely disregard the possibility that the U.S. 
government as a whole acts rationally to pursue its interests through ATS 
 
 
 15. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 7. For a discussion of constructivism and liberalism, see infra 
notes 122–27 and accompanying text. 
 16. See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 985. 
 17. See, e.g., Jeremy Sarkin, Reparations for Past Wrongs: Using Domestic Courts Around the 
World, Especially the United States, to Pursue African Human Rights Claims, 32 INT‘L J. LEGAL INFO. 
426, 429–30 (2004) (concluding that the ―[t]he issue of compensation‖ for human rights abuses 
through litigation ―has become so important‖ in part to ―deter future perpetrators from committing 
similar violations in the future‖). 
 18. See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 985. 
 19. See infra notes 41–78 and accompanying text. 
 20. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 94–111 (discussing the importance of cost-benefit analysis 
for debates on the constitutional law of foreign affairs, given the relative paucity of textual and 
historical evidence). 
 21. For a discussion of realism‘s similarities to, and differences from, other rational-choice 
approaches to international relations, see Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and 
Revisionism in International Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1422–26 (2006). See also infra notes 99–
127 and accompanying text. 
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litigation. Critics fail to consider the positive instrumental role that U.S. 
courts can play in foreign policy, particularly when the United States is a 
global provider of public goods seeking cooperation from other nations.
22
  
Second, the ATS critique relies on speculation, not actual experience. 
ATS litigation has resulted in just a handful of collectable judgments
23
 and 
has not provoked an economic or diplomatic crisis for the United States. 
So, the most trenchant criticism must be based on future, rather than past 
or present, costs. Yet critics‘ sometimes-catastrophic predictions—
including a 2003 ―nightmare‖ scenario of a $26 billion class action by 
100,000 Chinese plaintiffs within the decade—seem far from coming 
true.
24
 Five ATS lawsuits against Chinese government officials, which are 
a critical case study of ATS litigation‘s effects, have not caused any 
visible rupture in the U.S.-China relationship.
25
 Moreover, in 2004‘s Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court, addressing the ATS for the first 
time, limited actionable claims to certain core ―specific, universal, and 
obligatory‖ human rights norms.26 These constraints, as well as various 
jurisdictional and prudential tools available for courts to keep litigation in 
check and the actual history of ATS litigation, all suggest that it is unlikely 
to create the foreign policy problems its critics predict.
27
  
Moreover, concerns about sovereignty costs are unfounded. Critics fail 
to distinguish between the wholesale incorporation of customary 
international law into U.S. domestic law and the very limited application 
of a few universal, specific, and obligatory norms in Sosa-constrained 
ATS litigation.
28
 Critics also confuse the doctrinal act of applying an 
international law norm in ATS litigation with its actual effect on the body 
of U.S. domestic law, which is negligible. Federal courts have not 
 
 
 22. See infra notes 305–17 and accompanying text. 
 23. AKOH, supra note 6, at 57 (noting that approximately $300 had been collected from one of 
the African defendants); HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON, & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS (2007) (concluding that approximately $1.27 
million has been collected from three defendants). 
 24. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 4, at 122. 
 25. See, e.g., Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1266 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (entering a default 
declaratory judgment against the mayor of Beijing on claims by Falun Gong adherents for torture, 
arbitrary detention, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment following the 1999 crackdown). All 
other lawsuits against Chinese officials were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. See infra notes 214–
33 and accompanying text. 
 26. 542 U.S. 692, 749 (2004) (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (2003)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see infra notes 75–91 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 28. See infra Part II.C.1. 
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recognized ATS-actionable norms that do not already have counterparts in 
U.S. law, and they are unlikely to do so.
29
  
Finally, critics ignore the strategic benefits of ATS litigation, assuming 
that its success should be measured solely by its ability to improve human 
rights conditions worldwide and ―judicialize‖ international relations.30 By 
describing its goals in these grand terms, ATS critics set it up for failure. 
And while the advancement of human rights is a U.S. foreign policy 
objective, realist critics can reasonably insist that it must yield to more 
―fundamental‖ security and economic interests.31  
ATS litigation may advance not just human rights, but U.S. security 
and economic interests as well. By accounting for these effects, this 
Article offers the first comprehensive explanation of the benefits of ATS 
litigation.
32
 As the world‘s leading power, the United States provides a 
number of global public goods—such as support for global trade and 
security guarantees—from which it also benefits.33 It has the incentive to 
signal cooperativeness so that it can provide those public goods more 
easily, not because it is the most powerful state, but because it pays the 
highest costs when it engages in self-restraint. In its present form, ATS 
litigation represents a way for the United States to signal restraint more 
cheaply than by simply complying with international human rights norms. 
The United States signals cooperativeness in ATS litigation through 
respect for human rights law while shaping that law in a way that suits its 
interests and paying few, if any, sovereignty costs.  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes both the doctrinal 
and cost-benefit aspects of the debate about the ATS and the distinct, 
underlying assumptions about international relations held by critics and 
defenders. Part II responds to the functional critique of ATS litigation, 
explaining why it is self-contradictory and why its claims about the 
strategic effects of ATS litigation are unfounded. In Part III, I offer the 
 
 
 29. See infra notes 188–99 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 31. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 33; infra notes 253–60 and accompanying text. 
 32. Former U.S. diplomats, in arguing for some exceptions to sovereign immunity under the 
ATS, noted some of the strategic benefits of ATS litigation. See Brief for Former United States 
Diplomats as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 16, Samantar v. Yousef, 130 S. Ct. 2278 
(2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/09-10/08-1555_Respondent 
AmCu26FmrUSDiplomats.pdf (observing that human rights violations create economic and political 
instability and that advancing human rights aids the U.S. in its battle for ―hearts and minds‖ around the 
world). 
 33. See, e.g., MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE CASE FOR GOLIATH: HOW AMERICA ACTS AS THE 
WORLD‘S GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 7–9, 31–139 (2005) (describing numerous 
international public goods provided exclusively or primarily by the United States). 
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first account of ATS litigation‘s strategic benefits from a realist 
perspective. In doing so, it must be noted, I move slightly—but not too 
far—away from realism. Although a pure realist rejects any purpose for 
international law, if one leaves realist premises mostly intact but assumes 
that states will sometimes comply with human rights law to signal 
cooperativeness, a strategic purpose and benefit for the ATS emerges.
34
 
Part IV weighs the costs and benefits of ATS litigation and concludes that 
the benefits outweigh the costs. While the costs are often overstated, its 
benefits for advancing both human rights and the strategic interests of the 
United States justify and explain its continued existence.  
I. THE ATS, REALISM, AND REVISIONISM 
This section reviews the doctrinal and functional debate about ATS 
litigation against the backdrop of the broader debate about the formal 
status and purpose of international law. The critique of ATS litigation is 
part of a broader ―revisionist‖ view that the incorporation of CIL into U.S. 
law unwisely transfers power from the political branches and state 
governments to international institutions and unelected federal judges.
35
 
Although there are variations of revisionism and scholars who have carved 
out middle paths between revisionism and what is known as the ―modern 
position,‖36 I use the term revisionism here in a comprehensive sense: 
revisionists view modern international human rights litigation in U.S. 
federal courts—primarily through the ATS—as both pragmatically unwise 
and unsupported in text, history, or doctrine.
37
 
The revisionist view has both formal and functional aspects. Formalism 
concerns the ways courts should be constrained by doctrine and the best 
 
 
 34. Even ATS critics seem to agree that realism, while the most useful perspective, does not 
account for every interaction among nations. See infra notes 318–21 and accompanying text. 
 35. Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 21, at 1406–07. Revisionism can also be seen as a branch 
of the conservative critique of judicial ―activism,‖ although revisionism is not necessarily tied to 
conservative politics. See G. Edward White, Unpacking the Idea of the Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. 
REV. 1089, 1180–82 (2005) (discussing the relationship between revisionism on the Supreme Court, 
judicial restraint, and conservative politics). 
 36. The modern position generally refers to the view that CIL is, in some sense, part of U.S. 
federal common law cognizable by federal courts. See infra notes 60–78 and accompanying text. 
 37. It should be noted that some critics raise functional concerns about international human rights 
litigation without expressing agreement with the formal—i.e., doctrinal, historical, and textual—
critique of ATS litigation. See, e.g., Abebe, supra note 4. Although I refer to all critics as 
―revisionists,‖ and there is a connection between the formal and functional aspects of the critique, not 
all critics are ―revisionists‖ in the way the term was originally used by Professors Bradley and 
Goldsmith. See infra notes 60–78 and accompanying text. 
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interpretation of text, structure, and history.
38
 Functionalism, by contrast, 
weighs the costs, benefits, and efficiency of laws or procedures.
39
 Until 
now, the formalist side of the debate over ATS litigation has been much 
more prominent, but this is changing. The post-9/11 transformation of 
foreign affairs law has magnified the importance of functional arguments 
for expanded executive power and limited judicial power.
40
 This trend 
toward functionalism will likely exert more influence on the ATS debate 
in the future.  
A. The Alien Tort Statute 
The long-obscure provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act now known as 
the Alien Tort Statute—alternatively called the Alien Tort Claims Act41—
was famously described by Judge Henry Friendly as a ―legal Lohengrin‖ 
because ―no one seems to know whence it came.‖42 The lack of legislative 
 
 
 38. See Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 
638 (1999) (―[F]ormalist strategies . . . entail three commitments: to promot[e] compliance with all 
applicable legal formalities (whether . . . they make sense in the individual case), to ensur[e] rule-
bound law . . . and to constrain[] the discretion of judges . . . .‖). There is, of course, no consensus on 
the precise boundaries between formalism and functionalism. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL‘Y 21, 21–22 (1998) (contrasting constitutional formalism with constitutional functionalism 
and each theory‘s respective role in American legal history); Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and 
Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1549, 1555–56 (2009) (observing 
that the boundaries between functionalism and formalism are blurry). 
 39. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (describing 
functionalism as an inquiry into whether ―a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful 
in facilitating functions of government,‖ and concluding that ―[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the 
primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government‖); Pearlstein, supra note 38, at 
1556–58. 
 40. In general, the post-9/11 literature on the foreign affairs constitution has been influenced by 
the notion that terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are new threats that formalist 
understandings of the Constitution are inadequate to address. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 97–99; 
Pearlstein, supra note 38, at 1551–52. 
 41. 28 U.S.C. 1350 (2006). Those who interpret the provision as providing a cause of action 
prefer the label ―Alien Tort Claims Act,‖ while those who contend it is merely jurisdictional prefer 
―Alien Tort Statute.‖ Compare Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush 
Administration‟s Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169 (2004), with 
Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT‘L L. 587 (2002). I use ―Alien 
Tort Statute‖ here because that is the label given to it by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 
428, 436 (1989). 
 42. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). The Lohengrin of German legend is 
a knight who appears from nowhere to rescue a maiden, but disappears mysteriously when asked to 
reveal his origins. See ROBERT JAFFRAY, THE TWO KNIGHTS OF THE SWAN: LOHENGRIN AND HELYAS 
11 (1910). For a more detailed comparison of the ATS with Lohengrin, see Andrea Bianchi, 
International Law and US Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revisited, 15 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 751, 754 
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history has bedeviled interpreters for decades.
43
 In the first 200 years after 
its enactment, the ATS was recognized only twice as a source of 
jurisdiction.
44
  
The Second Circuit launched the modern ATS litigation revolution in 
1980 with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.
45
 Two Paraguayan nationals, Dr. Joel 
Filartiga and his daughter, filed suit in a U.S. district court in New York 
against a Paraguayan police official, who was then living in New York, for 
the torture and death of Filartiga‘s son in Paraguay.46 The Second Circuit 
upheld the jurisdiction of the district court under the ATS, reasoning that 
the Filartigas‘ claims arose under federal law because the ―constitutional 
basis for the Alien Tort Statute is the law of nations, which has always 
been part of the federal common law.‖47 The Second Circuit equated the 
law of nations with contemporary CIL and examined several sources of 
evidence—mainly, human rights treaties and U.N. declarations—in 
reaching its conclusion that there ―exists an international consensus that 
recognizes basic human rights and obligations owed by all governments to 
their citizens,‖ including the prohibition on official torture.48 For the first 
time, foreign nationals could sue one another in U.S. courts, even for CIL 
violations occurring in their home countries.
49
 
After Filartiga, many courts interpreted the ATS as providing a cause 
of action for violations of CIL.
50
 Still, ATS litigation developed rather 
 
 
(2004), and Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
830, 907 (2006). 
 43. For a recent attempt to unlock the original purpose of the ATS through examining the 
historical materials and structure of the 1789 Judiciary Act, see, for example, Lee, supra note 42, at 
906–07 (concluding that Congress intended the ATS to redress only violations of safe conduct, and 
suggesting that this original purpose should be translated to limit contemporary application of the ATS 
to violations with a sovereign U.S. nexus). 
 44. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864–65 (D. Md. 1961) (holding that concealing the 
foreign nationality of a child to bring her into the United States is a tort in violation of the law of 
nations); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810–11 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (finding jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the legality of the seizure of property of neutral aliens seized as prize cargo by a French 
privateer under the ATS); cf. Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 n.13 (1975) (noting 
that ATS jurisdiction ―may be available‖). Plaintiffs invoked the ATS in only about a dozen cases. See 
Lee, supra note 42, at 832 & n.6 (listing cases).  
 45. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 46. Id. at 877–78. 
 47. Id. at 878, 885. 
 48. Id. at 884 (quoting JOINT COMM., H.R. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS & S. COMM. ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 96TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR 1979, at 1 (Comm. 
Print 1980)). 
 49. Id. at 878 (―[D]eliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates 
universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the 
parties. Thus, whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within our 
borders, § 1350 provides federal jurisdiction.‖). 
 50. Filtargia itself did not hold this, although it has been often interpreted as having done so. 
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slowly. At first, plaintiffs targeted government officials or those acting 
under color of state authority.
51
 Congress seemed to approve of 
international human rights litigation by enacting the Torture Victims 
Protection Act (TVPA) in 1992.
52
 The TVPA provides a federal cause of 
action for damages against any ―individual who, under actual or apparent 
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation . . . subjects an individual 
to torture . . . or . . . extrajudicial killing.‖53 The TVPA has a narrower 
scope than the ATS in several ways—it imposes a ten-year statute of 
limitations, requires plaintiffs to exhaust local remedies, and provides 
relief only for a narrow set of claims.
54
 But unlike the ATS, which is 
limited to aliens, the TVPA permits U.S. citizens to obtain relief.
55
 Most 
courts interpret the TVPA as serving to complement, rather than replace, 
the ATS.
56
  
 
 
See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (―We thus join the Second Circuit [in Filartiga] in concluding that the 
[ATS] . . . creates a cause of action . . . .‖); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 
244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (―The ATCA provides a cause of action in tort for breaches 
of international law.‖ (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889)); see also Bradley, supra note 41, at 592 n.21. 
 51. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming judgment 
under the ATS against former Ethiopian official for torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a Bosnian Serb leader‘s 
alleged genocide, torture, and other atrocities were actionable under the ATS); Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1474–
75 (holding that the ATS not only provides federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction, but also 
creates a cause of action for an alleged violation of the law of nations); Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate 
of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig.), 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that alleged 
torture by the Philippine President violated customary international law and gave rise to subject matter 
jurisdiction of the federal courts under ATS); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187–89 (D. Mass. 
1995) (concluding that the Guatemalan military‘s tactics of torture, summary execution, 
―disappearance,‖ and arbitrary detention were actionable under ATS). 
 52. Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). The TVPA implemented legislation for the Convention Against 
Torture. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 65. 
 53. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73. 
 54. See id. § 2(b) (establishing an exhaustion of remedies requirement); id. § 2(c) (establishing a 
statute of limitations); id. § 3 (providing detailed definitions of torture and extrajudicial killing). 
 55. See Pamela J. Stephens, Spinning Sosa: Federal Common Law, The Alien Tort Statute, and 
Judicial Restraint, 25 B.U. INT‘L L.J. 1, 6–7 (2007). 
 56. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that ―the 
TVPA reaches conduct that may also be covered by the ATCA‖); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 
197 F.3d 161, 168–69 (5th Cir. 1999) (considering separately claims under the ATCA and TVPA that 
are ―essentially predicated on the same claims of individual human rights abuses‖); Abebe-Jira, 72 
F.3d at 848 (citing the TVPA as confirmation that the ATCA itself confers a private right of action); 
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241 (―The scope of the Alien Tort Act remains undiminished by enactment of the 
Torture Victim Act.‖); Hilao, 103 F.3d at 778–79 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the TVPA codifies the 
cause of action recognized to exist in the ATCA); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV 
8386, 2002 WL 319887, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (―[P]laintiffs‘ claims under ATCA are not 
preempted by the TVPA. . . . [T]he TVPA simply provides an additional basis for assertion of claims 
for torture and extrajudicial killing.‖); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 7–9 (D.D.C. 
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The ATS litigation against government officials was relatively 
unsuccessful in obtaining collectable judgments, and it was often thwarted 
by sovereign immunity and lack of personal jurisdiction.
57
 Plaintiffs began 
to search elsewhere for sources of recovery. In 1996, Burmese citizens and 
human rights groups sued the U.S. oil company Unocal in federal court in 
California for alleged complicity in human rights violations by the 
government of Myanmar (Burma) during the construction of an oil 
pipeline.
58
 The Unocal case marked the beginning of the next wave of 
ATS litigation aimed at holding multinational corporations (MNCs) liable 
for aiding and abetting human rights violations.
59
 
B. Revisionism  
Meanwhile, revisionism was born. It began as a formalist, doctrinal 
critique of conventional academic wisdom about the status of CIL as 
federal common law. In 1997, Jack Goldsmith and Curtis Bradley ―shook 
the international law academy‖ by criticizing what they termed ―the 
modern position.‖60 Adopted by the Restatement and many scholars, the 
modern position holds that CIL should be recognized by courts as federal 
common law that preempts state law—even CIL that has not been 
incorporated by the political branches through the constitutional 
lawmaking process.
61
  
 
 
1998) (recognizing simultaneous claims under the ATCA and the TVPA). But see Enahoro v. 
Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 884–85 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiffs could not assert claims of 
torture and extrajudicial killing as common law violations under the ATS generally and were instead 
required to assert such claims under the TVPA, which has superseded the ATS with respect to these 
specific claims). 
 57. Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights 
Litigation, 50 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 271, 276, 279 (2009). 
 58. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp 880, 883–84 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 59. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that case 
against Pfizer alleging nonconsensual medical experimentation on children in Nigeria could proceed 
under the ATS); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2007), reh‟g granted en 
banc, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007) (suit by residents of Bougainville Island, in Papua New Guinea, for 
injuries relating to the mining activities of Rio Tinto, PLC, a British multinational corporation); Doe I 
v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2005), appeal dismissed, 473 F.3d 345 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (suit by citizens of Indonesia against U.S. oil giant Exxon Mobil for complicity in 
atrocities committed by the Indonesian government in the rebellious province of Aceh). However, a 
divided panel of the Second Circuit has recently held that the ATS does not extend liability to 
corporations. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010); see also infra note 
249. 
 60. See William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 120 
HARV. L. REV. F. 19, 19 (2007) (observing that Bradley and Goldsmith‘s original argument about the 
status of CIL after Erie ―shook the international law academy‖). See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, 
Modern Position, supra note 3. 
 61. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Modern Position, supra note 3, at 819–20. 
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This revisionist critique differs with the modern position on the proper 
interpretation of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, which ended federal court 
creation of general common law and held that state common law should be 
applied ―[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by 
Acts of Congress.‖62 Customary international law—or ―the law of 
nations,‖ as it was then known—was originally considered part of the 
general common law, which both federal and state courts discerned.
63
 But 
Erie transformed our understanding of the common law: judges no longer 
discovered it, they made it. Declaring that ―there is no federal general 
common law,‖ Erie effectively left general common lawmaking to state 
courts and shrank federal courts‘ power.64 Because modern federal 
common lawmaking must be authorized by legislation, revisionists 
contend, there is no room for the independent judicial incorporation of 
CIL.
65
 
Focusing specifically on the ATS, revisionists argue that Erie‘s 
repudiation of the general common law background against which the 
ATS was enacted rendered it a dead letter. It is merely a jurisdictional 
statute that provides no substantive causes of action.
66
 This interpretation 
was adopted by conservative jurists—first by Judge Bork, and later by 
three Supreme Court Justices in Sosa.
67
 
Moreover, revisionists argue, CIL had evolved since 1789 in ways that 
made it particularly unsuited for incorporation into federal common law. 
Once devoted almost exclusively to nations‘ relations with one another, 
CIL now also addresses the way nations treat their own citizens.
68
 
Although the First U.S. Congress contemplated that some traditional CIL 
claims would be heard by federal courts under the ATS, revisionists argue, 
they would not have imagined that it would provide ―civil remedies in its 
courts for human rights violations committed abroad by foreign 
 
 
 62. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 63. Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. 
INT‘L L. 365, 393 (2002). 
 64. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; see Bradley & Goldsmith, Modern Position, supra note 3, at 852–54. 
 65. Bradley & Goldsmith, Modern Position, supra note 3, at 852–54. 
 66. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith III, The Current Illegitimacy of International 
Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 358 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, 
Current Illegitimacy]; A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 
YALE J. INT‘L L. 1 (1995). 
 67. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 739 (2004) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., and 
the Chief Justice, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (―[I]t is essential that [the 
allegedly violated law creates] an explicit grant of a cause of action before a private plaintiff be 
allowed to enforce principles of international law in a federal tribunal.‖).  
 68. Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 66, at 327. 
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government officials against aliens.‖69 In addition, modern CIL is 
especially unsuitable for incorporation, revisionists contend, because many 
modern CIL norms are embedded in human rights treaties and U.N. 
resolutions that the United States has refused to ratify or has ratified only 
with reservations.
70
 Incorporation of these norms through the ATS would 
―permit[] federal courts to accomplish through the back door of CIL what 
the political branches have prohibited through the front door of treaties.‖71  
In response, defenders of the modern position argue that the 
revisionists read too much into Erie, which held only that federal courts 
could not make a general common law of tort applicable in a state because 
Congress lacked the power to legislate such rules and the courts would be 
upsetting the federal-state allocation of authority in this area.
72
 Erie said 
nothing about the quite distinct issue of CIL‘s status as federal common 
law. Unlike the general common law, CIL norms can be incorporated by 
Congress into U.S. law through its enumerated constitutional power to 
define and punish offenses against the law of nations.
73
 This connection to 
explicit federal lawmaking authority ties CIL to modern federal common 
law, rather than the general common law. And because states have always 
lacked authority over foreign affairs matters, when federal courts 
recognize CIL norms, they do not infringe on areas of core state concern.
74
  
As for the ATS, defenders observed that the Court had recognized, 
from the founding era to the twentieth century, claims for violations of the 
law of nations.
75
 In The Paquete Habana, the Court famously declared that 
CIL ―is part of our law,‖ although its application by federal courts would 
be subject to executive or congressional override.
76
 Defenders interpret the 
 
 
 69. Id. at 360. 
 70. See Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 
567–68 (1997).  
 71. Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 66, at 330–31. 
 72. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga‟s Firm Footing: International Human 
Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 468 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is 
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1831 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, State 
Law]; Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997). 
 73. See Koh, State Law, supra note 72, at 1835. John Yoo and Julian Ku argue that state courts, 
rather than federal courts, are best suited to exercise the authority to recognize customary international 
law norms, subject to federal executive branch override. See Ku & Yoo, Beyond Formalism, supra 
note 4, at 215–16.  
 74. Koh, State Law, supra note 77, at 1831–32. 
 75. See id. at 1825. 
 76. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).  
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Court‘s use of ―our law‖ to mean federal common law, while revisionists 
interpret it to mean the general common law.
77
  
With the notable exception of Judge Bork‘s Tel-Oren concurrence, the 
courts generally adopted the modern position.
78
 ATS litigation continued 
for fourteen years before the Supreme Court finally weighed in.  
C. Sosa and Functional Approaches 
As the debate between revisionists and defenders of the modern 
position grew more heated in the late 1990s and early 2000s, many hoped 
the Supreme Court would definitively resolve the question, but to no avail. 
The Court waited until 2004 to interpret the ATS for the first time, in Sosa 
v. Alvarez-Machain.
79
 In Sosa, the United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) had hired Mexican nationals to abduct the plaintiff, 
Humberto Alvarez-Machain, from his home and bring him to the United 
States for trial. Alvarez sued his captors under the ATS and the U.S. 
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for arbitrary arrest 
and detention.
80
 Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court rejected 
Alvarez‘s claims, holding that his brief detention and transfer to the 
custody of U.S. authorities did not violate a norm of international law ―so 
well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy‖ under the 
ATS.
81
  
Justice Souter‘s majority opinion reflects an apparent decision by the 
Court to keep ATS litigation alive but constrained. The Court gave both 
revisionists and defenders something to cheer for, but in doing so left the 
status of CIL in U.S. law unclear.
82
 The Court held that, although the ATS 
 
 
 77. See Bradley, Goldsmith, & Moore, supra note 3, at 883 (discussing the academic debate on 
how to interpret Erie‘s effect on CIL). Compare Koh, State Law, supra note 72, at 1841, 1846 
(arguing that CIL's status as federal law preempting state law has been established since ―the 
beginning of the Republic‖ and reflects ―a long-accepted, traditional reading of the federal courts‘ 
function.‖), with Bradley & Goldsmith, Modern Position, supra note 3, at 822–26 (arguing that ―our 
law‖ referred to the general common law). 
 78. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 
25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (―We thus join the Second Circuit [in Filartiga] in concluding that 
the [ATS] creates a cause of action . . . .‖); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 
244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 79. 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). 
 80. Id. at 697–98. 
 81. Id. at 738. Alvarez‘s FTCA claims were rejected on the ground that his abduction took place 
outside the United States. See id. at 642. 
 82. Julian Ku, A No Decision Decision: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Debate Over the 
Domestic Status of Customary International Law, 101 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 267, 267 (2007) 
(concluding that Sosa supports neither the revisionist nor modern position but is ―a pragmatic but 
somewhat incoherent ratification of existing caselaw under the [ATS] based on no particular theory of 
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is a jurisdictional statute that does not create a cause of action, the 
common law gives rise to certain causes of action via the incorporation of 
a ―modest number‖ of international legal norms with ―a potential for 
personal liability.‖83 Sosa held that courts should recognize only CIL-
based claims resting on norms ―of international character accepted by the 
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of 
the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.‖84 The Court then cited, 
approvingly, language from several post-Filartiga cases limiting ATS 
liability to acts that violate ―specific, universal, and obligatory‖ norms.85  
Furthermore, the Court indicated that it was aware of the impact ATS 
litigation could have on U.S. interests abroad.
86
 In determining whether a 
norm is sufficiently defined to support a private right of action, Sosa held 
that courts must also consider ―risks of adverse foreign policy 
consequences‖ from crafting ―remedies for the violation of new norms of 
international law.‖87 The Court also observed that it would be appropriate 
for federal courts to give ―case-specific deference to the political 
branches‖ and require the ―exhaust[ion of] any remedies available in the 
domestic legal system.‖88  
The debate about history and doctrine, which Sosa failed to definitively 
resolve, has reached a ―stalemate.‖89 In the meantime, functional 
arguments about the costs and benefits of ATS litigation have been 
engaged only sporadically.
90
 The revisionist critique always contained a 
functionalist aspect: in the background was the concern that, because 
federal courts are both politically unaccountable and incompetent in 
 
 
incorporation‖). But see Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 3 (arguing that Sosa supports the 
revisionist position); Stephens, supra note 51 (arguing that Sosa endorsed the modern position); see 
also Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the 
Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111 (2004) (concluding that, because 
modern CIL human rights norms do not fit the criteria for universal jurisdiction in 1789, the set of 
post-Sosa ATS-actionable norms is an empty one).  
 83. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. 
 84. Id. at 725. The Court, here, refers to three specific offenses against the law of nations 
addressed by the criminal law of England and mentioned by Blackstone in his commentaries: violation 
of safe conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. See id. at 715 (citing 4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1769)). 
 85. Id. at 732 (quoting Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human 
Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 86. Id. at 727–28; see also Stephens, supra note 55, at 27 (observing that the Court addressed 
critics‘ functional concerns). 
 87. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727–28. 
 88. Id. at 733 n.21. 
 89. Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009).  
 90. See Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 459; Cleveland, supra note 6, at 986.  
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foreign affairs matters, they should not be given the authority to import 
external norms. After Sosa, Julian Ku and John Yoo observed that, in the 
―sharp[]‖ and ―bitter‖ debate about whether the ATS creates a cause of 
action, ―neither side has convinced the other‖ using formalist and 
originalist methods.
91
 Professors Ku and Yoo took ―a different approach,‖ 
conducting a functionalist, ―comparative institutional analysis of the role 
of the courts in foreign affairs.‖92 Their conclusion was that the costs of 
ATS litigation outweighed its benefits because the courts were 
incompetent to weigh the foreign policy implications of their judgments.
93
 
Other critics have focused on the security, economic, and human rights 
costs, making stark predictions that ATS litigation will run amuck.
94
 This 
functional critique was shared, at least in part, by the Bush administration, 
which, with the support of corporations fearful of lawsuits, reversed prior 
executive branch policy and began to intervene in favor of defendants in 
ATS cases.
95
  
Defenders of the ATS have answered the functional critique by 
emphasizing the value of ATS litigation for advancing human rights and 
downplaying its foreign affairs side effects.
96
 They have argued that ATS 
litigation enhances the legitimacy and authority of international law.
97
 
Defenders have also noted the difficulty of demonstrating actionable 
violations of CIL and the jurisdictional and prudential tools available to 
courts for restricting ATS litigation.
98
 Finally, they have observed that the 
protection of human rights is an official foreign policy goal of the United 
States and that the promotion of human rights enhances America‘s 
prestige.
99
 But defenders have not articulated a functional justification for 
ATS litigation that accounts for U.S. security and economic interests. 
 
 
 91. Ku & Yoo, Beyond Formalism, supra note 4, at 154. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 183. 
 94. See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 4, at 56; Abebe, supra note 4, at 21; Bradley, 
Costs, supra note 2, at 460; Rosen, supra note 4. 
 95. See Derek Baxter, Protecting the Power of the Judiciary: Why the Use of State Department 
„Statements of Interest‟ in Alien Tort Statute Litigation Runs Afoul of Separation of Powers Concerns, 
37 RUTGERS L.J. 807 (2006); Jide Nzelibe, Desperately Seeking Political Cover: The Partisan Logic of 
Alien Tort Statute Litigation (April 29–30, 2010) [hereinafter Nzelibe, Partisan Logic] (transcript 
available at www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Nzelibe_Alien_Tort_Statute.pdf). 
 96. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 6, at 976; Stephens, supra note 41, at 196–202. 
 97. See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 971. 
 98. See id. at 981; Stephens, supra note 41, at 196. 
 99. See AKOH, supra note 6, at 27.  
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D. Revisionism and International Relations Theory 
This debate about the purpose, scope, and proper operation of the ATS, 
and the status of CIL as common law more generally, has evolved against 
the backdrop of a broader discussion about the nature of international law. 
Most revisionists reject the concept—long a staple of international law 
scholarship—that international law exerts an independent ―compliance 
pull‖ on states.100 Therefore, revisionists tend to agree that ―much of 
customary international law is simply [a] coincidence of interest.‖101 
Nations bow to international institutions of law, but should only do so 
when it serves their interests.
102
 
This skepticism about international law reflects the influence of 
international relations realism.
103
 One of the most prominent IR 
paradigms, realism, rests on three fundamental premises.
104
 First, it holds 
that nation states—rather than individuals or institutions—are the basic 
units of action in world affairs.
105
 The nation state is sovereign in that it 
―decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external 
problems.‖106 Each nation is ―opaque‖: it has a unified relationship with 
the rest of the world.
107
 Second, states are undifferentiated rational actors 
driven by security interests, rather than regime type, norms, or 
institutions.
108
 And finally, the international system is characterized by 
anarchy because it lacks a central enforcement mechanism. Although there 
 
 
 100. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2005); 
Abebe, supra note 4, at 22. 
 101. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 100, at 225; see also Abebe, supra note 4, at 23. 
 102. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 100, at 234; Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, 
the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003); Julian G. Ku, The 
Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000). 
 103. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 
271–72 (5th ed. 1973) (1948) (contending that ―considerations of power rather than law‖ determine 
compliance with, and enforcement of, international law); Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 21, at 
1408. 
 104. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are Foreign Affairs Different?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1980, 
2000 (1993) (reviewing THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE 
RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992)); Keohane, supra note 8, at 158; Jeffrey W. Legro 
& Andrew Moravcsik, Is Anybody Still a Realist?, 24 INT‘L SEC. 5, 5, 8 (1999) (discussing the 
―degeneration‖ of realist theory after the end of the Cold War but observing that it ―remains the 
primary or alternative theory in virtually every major book and article addressing general theories of 
world politics, particularly in security affairs‖). 
 105. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 113 (1979).  
 106. Id. 
 107. Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 
503, 507 (1995) [hereinafter Slaughter, International Law). 
 108. See id. 
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are international laws and institutions, there is no world government with 
the power to enforce laws.
109
 The United Nations and the World Bank 
have no army or navy. Without such governing authority, nations can 
never be sure if others will abide by agreements, and they have no means 
of enforcing those agreements. They must engage in ―self-help.‖110 In this 
anarchic environment, each state seeks to maximize its own economic and 
military capacity relative to the others.
111
 This instability in the system, 
realists contend, means that states have high discount rates. They seek 
short-term gains rather than exercising self-restraint in favor of 
longer-term gains.  
For realists, efforts to construct a framework of binding international 
legal norms are misguided and driven by naïve cosmopolitanism.
112
 
Realists view CIL as largely reflecting the interests of the great powers 
that dominate the international system.
113
 As a great power, the United 
States can shape international law norms and depart from them when it 
suits its purposes.
114
 Because it can ignore international law, the United 
States suffers the greatest sovereignty costs from complying with 
international law norms that do not coincide with its interests.
115
 
A pure realist approach, then, has no use for international law because 
it serves no purpose. The difficulty with this approach, however, is that it 
fails to explain why nations expend vast resources on developing 
international law, including complex treaty regimes with dispute 
resolution mechanisms such as the WTO.
116
 And even the United States 
feels the need to argue that it complies with customary international 
human rights norms.
117
 Revisionists have acknowledged, therefore, that 
realism does not completely describe the way that nations interact.
118
 
 
 
 109. See JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 30, 51 (2001). 
 110. Id. at 33; WALTZ, supra note 105, at 100. 
 111. See MEARSHEIMER, supra note 109, at 33–34.  
 112. See, e.g., John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?, 10 TRANSNAT‘L 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 37 (2000); Stephen D. Krasner, Realist Views of International Law, 96 AM. 
SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 265, 268 (2002) (―It is naive to expect that a stable international order can be 
erected on normative principles embodied in international law.‖). 
 113. Abebe, supra note 4, at 21. 
 114. Id. at 25. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 
1823, 1837–38 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, Compliance Theory]. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 41 n.150; Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New 
International Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 463, 468 (rejecting the view, attributed to 
some ―realists,‖ that ―international law does nothing at all‖). 
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In contrast, defenders of ATS litigation tend to be influenced by the 
other, nonrealist end of the IR spectrum. They argue that ATS litigation 
enhances ―the efforts of global civil society in developing the human 
rights regime.‖119 Defenders place importance on the role played in ATS 
litigation by subnational and transnational units, such as domestic 
constituencies, NGOs, and international institutions.
120
 These units can act 
as ―norm entrepreneurs‖ that develop human rights principles with the 
power to influence cultures and governments, in part through litigation.
121
  
These views of ATS litigation and international law reflect the 
influence of liberalism and constructivism.
122
 In contrast to the realist 
premise that states are undifferentiated opaque units, liberalism 
emphasizes the ways that regime type, domestic interest groups, and 
international institutions affect state interactions. Liberal, democratic 
states tend to have less conflict with one another and enter into and 
comply with legal agreements more often.
123
 Governments comply with 
international law in part because domestic interest groups exert 
pressure.
124
 ATS litigation succeeds because domestic constituencies 
shape nations‘ preferences for human rights. Constructivism emphasizes 
the role of perceptions and beliefs in shaping state behavior.
125
 For 
constructivists, similarly situated states may act differently because they 
have divergent understandings of the strategic environment and other 
states‘ intentions.126 These perceptions and beliefs can be shaped by 
exogenous forces, such as ATS litigation, that encourage states to 
internalize human rights norms.
127
  
 
 
 119. Cleveland, supra note 6, at 975–76. 
 120. See Cheryl Holzmeyer, Human Rights in an Era of Neoliberal Globalization: The Alien Tort 
Claims Act and Grassroots Mobilization in Doe v. Unocal, 43 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 271, 272 
(describing how human rights activists in the United States and Burma mobilized in support of the 
ATS claims against Unocal and emphasizing the impact of ―a transnationally attuned legal 
mobilization framework‖). 
 121. See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 
HOUS. L. REV. 623, 647 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, International Law]. 
 122. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 11–12. 
 123. See Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 21, at 1432–33; Andrew Moravcsik, Taking 
Preference Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT‘L ORG. 513, 513 (1997); 
Slaughter, International Law, supra note 107. 
 124. See Moravcsik, supra note 123, at 513. 
 125. See Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 21, at 1435–36. See generally ALEXANDER WENDT, 
SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999). 
 126. Robert Jervis, Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation, 40 WORLD POL. 317, 337 (1988). 
 127. Cleveland, supra note 6, at 976–79; Ochoa, supra note 14, at 108–09. Peter Spiro has 
recently used liberalist and constructivist approaches to predict that subnational institutions, including 
―disaggregated governmental components beyond the traditional foreign policy apparatus,‖ may be 
developing an institutional interest in the incorporation of international law into domestic law. Peter S. 
  
 
 
 
 
1138 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:1117 
 
 
 
 
Institutionalism is another major paradigm of international relations 
theory that shares many assumptions with realism. It also holds that states 
are unitary, rational agents pursuing their interests in an anarchic world.
128
 
However, institutionalists conclude that nations cooperate to maximize 
absolute gains and that international institutions—including international 
law—can facilitate cooperation.129 It is important to note that an 
institutionalist need not ascribe to the view that states have an innate 
interest in complying with international law or sense of obligation to do 
so.
130
 And institutionalist views can lead one to conclude that ATS 
litigation is either wise or unwise, depending on its potential for 
maximizing payoffs.  
With revisionists influenced by realism and defenders influenced by its 
alternatives, little common ground currently exists from which to evaluate 
the costs and benefits of ATS litigation. Neither side has effectively 
engaged with the other. Yet one‘s theoretical approach to international 
relations need not dictate a particular view of ATS litigation. Realism may 
be entirely consistent with the conclusion that ATS litigation is 
strategically beneficial for the United States.
131
  
II. THE REALIST CRITIQUE OF ATS LITIGATION  
This Section describes the realist, functional ATS critique and explains 
why it is problematic. The revisionists argue that the domestic 
incorporation of CIL should only be effectuated through the political 
branches in the form of legislation, executive-branch action, or, if the 
courts are to be involved at all, very strong deference to executive-branch 
interpretation.
132
 The revisionist critique consists of three primary 
arguments. First, revisionists contend that ATS litigation imposes 
significant sovereignty costs on the United States by importing exogenous 
legal norms that lack democratic pedigree. In an anarchic world with 
shifting power balances, it is unwise for the United States to commit itself 
 
 
Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in International Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 196 
(2004). 
 128. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY 17–21 (2008). 
 129. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 21, at 1430.  
 130. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 
1950–51 (2002). 
 131. See infra Part IV. 
 132. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 19. 
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to particular international law norms.
133
 Second, revisionists argue that 
ATS litigation harms U.S. security and economic interests by causing 
friction with allies and potential rivals. Finally, revisionists contend that, 
to the extent the United States has a national interest in improving human 
rights worldwide, ATS litigation fails to further this interest and in fact 
may thwart it. 
Below, I begin with general difficulties that the revisionist approach 
fails to overcome: it relies on institutional competence arguments that are 
questionable, and it draws on insights from realism without fully accepting 
the implications of applying realism to evaluate the role of courts in 
foreign affairs. I then explain why the specific functional arguments 
against ATS litigation lack support and do not properly weigh 
countervailing evidence.  
A. Courts‟ Competence in Foreign Affairs 
The arguments advanced by the ATS‘s critics are often intertwined 
with a set of assumptions about the comparative institutional competence 
of courts and the executive branch in foreign affairs. Many, but not all, 
revisionists rely on these assumptions to argue for strong deference by the 
courts to the executive branch in other contexts.
134
  
These institutional competence claims are rooted in an outdated version 
of IR realism.
135
 The realist justification for executive hypercompetence 
and judicial incompetence in foreign affairs proceeds along the following 
lines: due to the anarchic and fluid nature of the international realm, 
executive primacy is justified by the executive‘s superior expertise, 
information gathering, and political savvy in foreign affairs. Foreign 
affairs matters are particularly complicated, and the meaning of 
international law changes with geopolitical shifts; courts are ill suited to 
address foreign affairs because they lack special expertise, are relatively 
inflexible, and hear only the issues selected by litigants.
136
 Because nations 
are unitary actors on the world stage, the United States must ―speak with 
 
 
 133. Abebe, supra note 4, at 8–9; McGinnis & Somin, Political Economy, supra note 4, at 1.  
 134. See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign 
Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 200–01 (2006) [hereinafter Ku 
& Yoo, Hamdan]; Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 1170, 1202 (2007); John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation, 
90 CALIF. L. REV. 1305, 1305 (2002) (arguing for total deference to executive interpretations of 
treaties, based in part on the anarchic nature of the international realm). 
 135. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 127–38. 
 136. See Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 134, at 200–01; Posner & Sunstein, supra note 134, at 
1204–05. 
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one voice‖ in foreign relations through the executive branch, without the 
courts second guessing its decisions, or risk creating confusion and 
suffering embarrassment and weakness.
137
 The executive branch can better 
respond to changes in an unstable world because it can move with unity 
and speed, while federal courts are decentralized, rarely able to make 
uniform or quick decisions, and change course very slowly.
138
 Finally, as 
the least politically accountable branch, the judicial system least reflects 
the national interest and is least likely to be responsive to national security 
needs.
139
  
These realism-based institutional competence assumptions are 
intuitively very persuasive. That is why they are often simply stated as 
―traditional . . . understandings‖ and persist in court decisions.140 But they 
are surprisingly brittle. This classic realist model of institutional 
competence proves unhelpful for three reasons. First, as a descriptive 
matter, it does not accurately depict the actual functioning of the branches 
in foreign affairs. The executive does not in fact always dominate. For 
example, although foreign relations is said to require that the United States 
―speak with one voice,‖ Congress and the President often conflict on 
foreign policy.
141
 Second, maintaining a distinct model of foreign affairs 
institutional competence becomes increasingly problematic as 
globalization continues to blur the distinction between domestic and 
foreign affairs issues.
142
 Federal courts are increasingly required to handle 
cases involving foreign parties and foreign activities. And finally, the 
realist model proves too much because, if actually adopted, it would 
 
 
 137. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008) (―The Judiciary is not suited to second-guess . . . 
determinations that would require federal courts to . . . undermine the Government‘s ability to speak 
with one voice in this area.‖); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) 
(―[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.‖). 
 138. See, e.g., Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 134, at 200 (arguing that the institutional structure 
of the federal judiciary—ninety-four district courts and thirteen appellate courts—inherently makes the 
judicial process slow); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 980 
(2004) (―In the context of foreign affairs . . . an authoritative settlement of the law across time and 
institutions . . . . potentially results in the creation of a constitutional straight-jacket binding the 
decision-making freedom of the political branches in the international arena.‖). 
 139. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 134, at 1213. 
 140. See, e.g., id. at 1202 (describing the justifications for special deference in foreign relations as 
―often less textual than functional, based on traditional practices and understandings‖). For a fuller 
discussion of realism‘s influence on the development of foreign affairs law, see Knowles, supra note 
10, at 111–26. 
 141. See Nzelibe, supra note 138, at 965–66 (discussing examples); Martin H. Redish, Judicial 
Review and the „Political Question,‟ 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1052 (1985) (observing that the nation 
has survived despite interbranch disagreement in foreign affairs). 
 142. See Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
1230, 1231–35 (2007). 
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require total deference by the courts to the executive, and it tells us very 
little about how best to balance foreign policy effectiveness against other 
constitutional values.
143
  
In the end, the traditional competency-based arguments against courts‘ 
involvement in foreign affairs paint with too broad a brush. They offer 
little utility for determining whether ATS litigation harms or benefits the 
United States. These arguments do not take account of the possibility that 
the courts and the executive branch can work in complementary fashion in 
foreign affairs, just as they do in domestic affairs.
144
 As foreign policy 
instruments, courts may be useful in some respects and less so in others.  
B. Contradictions in the Realist Critique  
While the classic realist competence model proves problematic for 
evaluating the role of courts in foreign affairs generally, the use of realism 
also poses unique problems for the critics of ATS litigation. Realism‘s 
great strength is in its parsimony.
145
 It treats nations as single units with 
one overriding interest: their security.
146
 But this parsimony creates 
problems for the critique of ATS litigation. The ATS critique treats other 
nations as single units, but does not treat the United States as a unitary 
actor because it makes claims about the comparative effectiveness of U.S. 
institutions.
147
 Drawing on the anarchic nature of world politics to critique 
the role of the courts in domestic governance, the ATS critique pierces the 
veil of the unitary state. Under Sosa, the ATS embodies Congress‘s 
instruction that courts entertain suits alleging a limited set of CIL 
claims.
148
 Yet the core of the revisionist critique is that this instruction is 
not rational because it is welfare-negative for the United States. 
Revisionists must somewhat dissociate the courts from the pursuit of the 
national interest. 
 
 
 143. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 130–34. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See FAREED ZAKARIA, FROM WEALTH TO POWER: THE UNUSUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICA‘S 
WORLD ROLE 35 (1998) [hereinafter ZAKARIA, WEALTH]. Zakaria observes that classical realism‘s 
―extreme parsimony‖ is its ―great strength‖ because this can be a basis for elegant, easily falsifiable 
propositions that enable it to be ―powerfully predictive.‖ Id.  
 146. WALTZ, supra note 105, at 79–98. Waltz and other realists acknowledge that the actual 
interactions of nations will often depart significantly from these assumptions, but observe that the 
value of descriptive accuracy must be weighed against the greater predictive power of a parsimonious 
theory. Kenneth N. Waltz, Laws and Theories, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 27, 34 (Robert O. 
Keohane ed., 1986). 
 147. See, e.g., Ku & Yoo, Beyond Formalism, supra note 4, at 189. 
 148. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (interpreting the ATS as a jurisdictional 
statute that nonetheless makes actionable violations of a limited set of CIL norms). 
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To some degree, this reflects a problem with realism itself. The 
classical version did not merely predict, but purported to advise the 
statesman on how best to manage foreign policy and international affairs 
in an unstable world. A rough-and-ready version of classical realism is the 
unacknowledged foundation for much of courts‘ and scholars‘ 
justifications for executive primacy in foreign affairs.
149
 The revisionist 
critique is very much in this tradition. By contrast, however, the more 
contemporary incarnation of IR realism, called neorealism, has been 
devoted, with some exceptions, to analyzing and predicting states‘ 
behavior as dictated by the structure of the international system.
150
 There 
is far less room for normative arguments about statecraft. In this way, the 
revisionist critique sits quite uneasily with neorealism.  
Revisionists must reach beyond realism because it does not provide 
much space for criticizing international human rights litigation in U.S. 
courts. Assuming first, as the pure realist must, that the United States is, as 
a whole, a rational actor, how can we descriptively account for the 
persistence of welfare-negative ATS litigation?
151
 Congress has not 
reigned in the ATS since Filartiga, and in fact has expanded the federal 
courts‘ role in international human rights litigation through the ATS‘s 
sibling, the TVPA.
152
 Does the proliferation of ATS litigation then call 
into question the predictive accuracy of the realist insights animating the 
revisionist critique?  
This difficulty is not insurmountable for the ATS critic drawing on 
realism. ATS litigation may persist as a strategic mistake that must be 
corrected.
153
 Yet it is significant that the revisionist critique proceeds from 
a worldview that imagines other nations as acting strategically in response 
to ATS litigation without considering that ATS litigation itself may have 
strategic value for the United States. Instead, critics have reasoned that 
ATS litigation must be driven by nonrealist paradigms of international 
relations. A more holistic realist approach to the ATS‘s costs and benefits 
 
 
 149. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 111–16. 
 150. See Keohane, supra note 8, at 25–27. 
 151. Cf. Hathaway and Lavinbuk, supra note 21, at 1434 (critiquing Goldsmith & Posner‘s use of 
state‘s internal political economies as determining state preferences on the ground that it creates 
ambiguity about state‘s interests, and observing that ―the possibility that the desires of powerful 
substate actors may be welfare-negative for the states as whole units‖ is ―decidedly inconsistent with 
[the] general assumption that states can be treated as rational unitary actors‖).  
 152. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
 153. See John J. Mearsheimer, Structural Realism, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES: 
DISCIPLINE AND DIVERSITY 71, 74 (Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith eds., 2006) (observing 
that, although states are rational actors, they ―operate with imperfect information in a complicated 
world‖ and ―sometimes make serious mistakes.‖).  
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considers the ways in which the branches provide diverse means of 
achieving foreign policy goals. In Part III, I offer such an approach. 
C. The Problematic Functional Arguments Against ATS Litigation 
Below, I explain why each aspect of the revisionist critique is 
problematic. In general, the critique overvalues the security and economic 
costs of ATS litigation and undervalues the human rights benefits. But 
more importantly, the revisionist critique relies largely on speculation 
about future harms from ATS litigation that are very unlikely to occur. 
Revisionists also ascribe ambitious objectives to ATS litigation that it 
cannot possibly meet, making it easier to portray ATS litigation as 
ineffectual. These errors lead to a skewed assessment of costs and benefits.  
1. Sovereignty Costs 
A pillar of the realist ATS critique involves the sovereignty costs from 
the importation of international human rights norms into the U.S. legal 
system.
154
 Under a realist paradigm of international relations, state 
sovereignty is the core building block of the global system.
155
 Because the 
United States has ratified so few treaties governing human rights, CIL is 
the basis for most claims under the ATS.
156
 Revisionists argue that CIL, in 
its current form, is so likely to be different from U.S. law that its use by 
U.S. courts imposes serious sovereignty costs.
157
 There are two major 
problems with this argument. First, revisionists tend to lump together ATS 
litigation, which involves only a modest set of core CIL claims, with the 
wholesale incorporation of CIL into domestic law.
158
 Second, the 
revisionist argument confuses the doctrinal act of applying a CIL norm in 
ATS litigation with its actual effect on the body of U.S. domestic law.
159
  
The revisionists‘ sovereignty concern stems from both the substance of 
international human rights law and the processes of its development. With 
some limited exceptions, CIL traditionally governed relationships among 
states and could be determined by examining state behavior and opinio 
juris, the belief on the part of states that they have a legal obligation to 
 
 
 154. See, e.g., Abebe, supra note 4, at 3–5; Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 465–66. 
 155. See WALTZ, supra note 105, at 47. 
 156. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.  
 157. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 22–23. 
 158. See, e.g., Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 464 (describing costs to U.S. democracy from 
international human rights litigation because of ―the type of law typically applied in these cases‖). 
 159. See infra notes 184–90 and accompanying text. 
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obey norms established by state behavior.
160
 Of course, defining ―state 
behavior‖ has always been a serious challenge. What sources should be 
consulted? Most states do not declare their own practices, and there is no 
consensus about the appropriate interpretive method to determine whether 
practices are widespread or consistent. And how does one discern what 
states actually believe about their own obligations?
161
  
Much of recent human rights law adds an additional layer of difficulty 
because it develops quickly from diffuse sources and purports to regulate 
the relationship between states and their own citizens.
162
 International 
human rights norms increasingly derive, not from state practice, but from 
an ever-proliferating constellation of nonratified multilateral treaties, as 
well as from national constitutions, unanimous and near-unanimous 
declarations of the U.N. General Assembly, and other international fora 
such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
163
 These agreements cover 
an increasingly broad array of issues traditionally thought to be of purely 
domestic concern, in areas such as labor, family, and environmental law. 
The development of these human rights norms is shaped by academics—
―the professors, the writers of textbooks and casebooks, and the authors of 
articles in leading international law journals‖—as well as 
transgovernmental human rights advocacy organizations.
164
  
According to the revisionists, incorporation of the ―new‖ CIL into U.S. 
domestic law imposes sovereignty costs on the United States.
165
 Under a 
realist view of international law, the ―traditional‖ CIL merely reflects the 
interests of the great powers. As the sole superpower or hegemon, the 
United States is in a favorable position to dictate the framework of 
traditional CIL.
166
 But the United States has less ability to influence a 
rapidly developing body of indeterminate law shaped by international 
elites. This is evidenced by the fact that the United States often fails to 
ratify, or attaches reservations or modifications to, the international 
conventions and treaties supporting many new CIL norms. Moreover, the 
United States and Europe have diverged in their understandings of 
important CIL norms, including those that govern the use of the death 
penalty and preventive war.
167
 Because the new human rights CIL norms 
 
 
 160. Abebe, supra note 4, at 22–23.  
 161. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1207–08. 
 162. Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 462. 
 163. See id. 
 164. Louis B. Sohn, Sources of International Law, 25 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 399, 399 (1996). 
 165. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1177–78. 
 166. Abebe, supra note 4, at 25. 
 167. See Warren Allmand et al., Human Rights and Human Wrongs: Is the United States Death 
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do not reflect the outcome of the democratic process in the United States 
(unless they have been duly ratified by domestic political decision 
making), they are less likely to reflect U.S. interests.
168
  
Sovereignty is the ability of a state to exclude ―external actors from 
domestic authority structures.‖169 Because the United States dominates 
international politics, it can afford to ignore international law harmful to 
its interests. Therefore, the revisionist argument goes, the United States 
suffers the largest sovereignty costs of any nation from incorporating CIL 
norms into its domestic legal framework.
170
  
However, it is not at all apparent that ATS litigation constrained by 
Sosa‘s limitations actually imposes significant sovereignty costs. U.S. 
courts are not ―outside actors,‖ but internal actors. Again, in order to 
accept the revisionist argument, one must first assume that the federal 
courts—as institutions of the U.S. government—are capable of acting in a 
manner antithetical to U.S. interests. This contradicts the realist 
descriptive insight—relied on by revisionists—that a state complies with 
international law only when it is in its interest.
171
 Under a pure realist 
approach assuming a unitary United States government, if a court applies a 
CIL norm, it must be doing so to further U.S. interests. The sovereignty 
cost would then be zero because the U.S. has not ceded any power to 
external actors merely by using international law as the rationale for doing 
what it sought to do anyway.
172
 To posit sovereignty costs from ATS 
litigation, revisionists must depart from realism by disaggregating the 
unitary state and associating state interests with the policies of one or both 
of the political branches rather than the less-accountable courts. When the 
courts apply a CIL norm over the objection of the political branches, they 
allegedly cause an inefficient result.  
But even identifying state interests with the political branches does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that ATS litigation imposes sovereignty 
costs. ATS litigation does not result from a clash between the political 
branches and the courts. Congress enacted the ATS, and the President 
 
 
Penalty System Inconsistent with International Human Rights Law?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2793 
(1999); McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1179. 
 168. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1178–79. 
 169. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 20 (1999). 
 170. Abebe, supra note 4, at 26. 
 171. See supra notes 112–18 and accompanying text. 
 172. Barry Friedman has recently offered an account of Supreme Court history, concluding that it 
never strays very far from popular opinion. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009). 
To the extent this account is accurate, it casts doubt on the usefulness of associating state interests 
merely with the current position of the executive branch.  
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signed it into law. Some administrations have been more supportive of 
ATS litigation than others.
173
 Assuming that the Sosa interpretation is 
correct, Congress and the President empowered the courts to hear certain 
CIL-based claims, contemplating that CIL norms could be ―locked in‖ 
absent a legislative override.
174
 Think of the executive branch as divisible 
into ―time zero‖ (executive policy at the time of enactment) and ―time 
one‖ (executive policy in the present). If the ―time one‖ executive branch 
objects to the incorporation of CIL norms, but Congress does not object, 
Congress and the ―time zero‖ executive disagree with the ―time one‖ 
executive. The revisionist critique, therefore, must ultimately rest on one 
of two premises: either the ―time one‖ executive alone most accurately 
represents the national interest, or the courts exceed their congressional 
mandate by incorporating CIL norms. 
Equating U.S. interests with the current policies of the executive 
branch is a simple solution harmonious with IR realism. Indeed, ―time 
one‖ executive primacy in foreign affairs, as articulated by scholars and 
courts, owes a great deal to the persuasiveness of realism.
175
 The President 
alone is elected by the entire nation and can best be said to represent its 
overall interests.
176
 But if we are to accept the ―time one‖ executive 
definition of the national interest, we must also accept that the separation 
of powers in itself has always imposed massive inefficiency upon the 
pursuit of those interests abroad. The United States has never strictly 
spoken ―with one voice‖ in foreign affairs.177 The Constitution‘s text 
allocates foreign affairs powers to both the Congress and the President.
178
 
In practice, Congress has disagreed with the President, even regarding 
highly sensitive national security matters.
179
 Congress and the ―time zero‖ 
executive can bind the ―time one‖ executive through legislation that 
provides courts with a role, such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA).
180
 And the courts have, from the very beginning, rejected 
 
 
 173. See Nzelibe, Partisan Logic, supra note 95, at 3. 
 174. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694, 714 (2004) (concluding that Congress 
would not have intended for the ATS to be ―stillborn,‖ providing jurisdiction but no causes of action); 
Nzelibe, Partisan Logic, supra note 95, at 3 (exploring ATS litigation through the lens of distributive 
domestic politics and observing that Democratic administrations are more likely than Republican 
administrations to use ―expansive judicial interpretation in human rights controversies as an effective 
partisan entrenchment strategy to lock in their preferred ideological objectives‖). 
 175. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 125.  
 176. See Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 134. 
 177. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the „One Voice‟ Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 
46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 975–76 (2001). 
 178. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 92. 
 179. Nzelibe, supra note 138, at 965–66 (discussing examples). 
 180. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2006) (transferring the determination of sovereign immunity from 
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executive branch interpretations of treaties.
181
 Although the separation of 
powers has been criticized as interfering with the ability of the United 
States to form a unified foreign policy, this is the government that the 
Constitution created.
182
 If any limit on ―time one‖ executive power in 
foreign affairs imposes sovereignty costs, ATS litigation represents a very 
minor problem. 
This is probably why the revisionist critique largely ignores Congress 
and focuses on the perils of rogue courts, invoking their institutional 
deficiencies: decentralized and slow decision making, lack of flexibility, 
lack of democratic accountability, and lack of expertise.
183
 This alleged 
judicial incompetence in foreign affairs—perhaps combined with a desire 
to further the internationalist project of a global rule of law—will, 
according to revisionist predictions, lead courts to exceed their ATS 
mandate and incorporate exogenous norms.  
But there is no evidence that this has happened. As Sosa makes clear, 
ATS litigation does not operate as a wholesale incorporation of CIL into 
the domestic legal framework.
184
 ATS litigation is an evolving hybrid: 
international law supplies the norm that the defendant is alleged to have 
violated, but other rules of decision are more likely to come from domestic 
law.
185
 Because U.S. law tends to take a more expansive view of tort 
liability and jurisdiction than international law, the application of U.S., 
rather than international, rules of decision will likely lead to a broader 
scope for ATS litigation, rather than the other way around.
186
 For example, 
some courts interpreting the ATS have recognized indirect investor 
liability, which is largely unrecognized outside the United States.
187
  
More importantly, Sosa limits the scope of ATS litigation to specific, 
universal, and obligatory claims: for violations of norms ―accepted by the 
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of 
 
 
the executive branch via the State Department to the judiciary). 
 181. See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical 
Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 506–08 (2007) (discussing cases). 
 182. See, e.g., Lloyd N. Cutler, To Form a Government, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 126, 128 (1980) (noting 
that a shortcoming of the constitutional structure of the United States is the ―inability to ‗form a 
government‘‖). 
 183. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 26; Ku & Yoo, Beyond Formalism, supra note 4, at 217. 
 184. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 700–01 (2004) (interpreting the ATS as a 
jurisdictional statute that nonetheless makes actionable violations of a limited set of CIL norms). 
 185. William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of 
International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 639 (2006); see also Lee, supra note 42, at 882 (concluding 
that the ―common law . . . supplied the right to sue and defined the elements of the cause of action; the 
international law reference was necessary only to identify when aliens were entitled to sue‖). 
 186. Ramsey, supra note 57, at 321. 
 187. See id.  
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the 18th-century paradigms,‖ such as violations of safe conduct, 
infringements of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.
188
 Lower courts 
have recognized contemporary analogues as including prohibitions on 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, summary 
execution, disappearance, and forced labor.
189
 There is very little question 
that these norms are identical to norms that are already part of U.S. 
domestic law.
190
  
ATS litigation can only be said to impose sovereignty costs if it 
requires a change in the domestic authority structure because of the 
influence of some outside actor, such as another nation or an international 
elite. If courts are applying norms in ATS litigation that are 
simultaneously international and domestic, no change is required and there 
is no sovereignty cost.  
In the future, courts could recognize norms under the ATS that are 
truly exogenous in that their separate existence as part of domestic U.S. 
law is in serious dispute. But such instances are likely to be very rare. 
Although U.S. power may decline relative to that of other nations, the U.S. 
will, for the foreseeable future, still exercise considerable influence over 
the development of CIL, despite divergence from Europe, the rise of 
powers in Asia, and the increased role of international elites.
191
 It is hard to 
imagine a U.S. court recognizing a universal, specific, and obligatory CIL 
norm that does not also find parallel support in U.S. domestic law. Even 
when judges disagree among themselves about whether a particular norm 
meets the universal, specific, and obligatory ATS threshold, this does not 
mean that the norm at issue does not have a long-established analogue in 
U.S. domestic law. For example, in a Second Circuit ATS case involving 
 
 
 188. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25. 
 189. See id. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (crimes against humanity); Doe v. Unocal 
Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2002) (forced labor); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 
(11th Cir. 1996) (torture); Kadic v. Karadic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995) (genocide and war 
crimes); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 
1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (summary execution); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. 
Mass. 1995) (summary execution and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 
694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (disappearance). 
 190. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2006) (prohibiting genocide); 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2006) 
(prohibiting sale into involuntary servitude); 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2006) (prohibiting forced labor); 18 
U.S.C. § 2340 (2006) (prohibiting torture). 
 191. See Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1210, 1227–29 
(2005) (noting that ―the United States has historically been a major proponent and progenitor of 
international law norms‖ and discussing U.S. influence over international economic law); Sarah 
Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT‘L L. 1, 102 (2006) (―The United States was 
the primary instigator behind the establishment of the UN system and the creation of modern 
international treaties ranging from human rights and humanitarian law to international intellectual 
property and international trade.‖). 
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allegations that Pfizer conducted experimental drug trials on Nigerians 
without their consent, the majority concluded that a norm against 
nonconsensual human medical experimentation met the Sosa threshold, 
while the dissent vigorously disagreed.
192
 Nonetheless, the norm 
prohibiting nonconsensual experimentation has long been a part of U.S. 
law.
193
  
In addition, as U.S. power declines, any sovereignty costs from 
complying with Sosa-threshold CIL would also decline.
194
 This means that 
the more likely the U.S. courts are to incorporate exogenous norms by 
adhering to Sosa, the less likely that incorporation is to impose significant 
sovereignty costs. And a safety valve exists because the political branches 
possess the power to override judicial overreaching through legislation. 
This solution imposes its own efficiency costs, but reduces the risk that 
exogenous CIL norms could be locked in domestically.
195
 
Finally, the indeterminate nature of much of contemporary CIL—
decried by revisionists—actually reduces the risk of sovereignty costs.196 
Indeterminacy in CIL empowers the U.S. judges interpreting that law, not 
the foreign actors and international elites making the law. The more 
indeterminate the law, the less norms can truly be called exogenous. Much 
of the concern about sovereignty costs is actually misplaced concern about 
judicial lawmaking.  
2. Foreign Policy Costs 
Revisionists also contend that ATS litigation imposes serious costs on 
the pursuit of U.S. economic and security interests abroad.
197
 For the most 
part, criticism has consisted of speculation about future consequences, 
rather than past or present effects, of ATS litigation. But the concern is 
that human rights advocates driving ATS litigation may pursue goals at 
 
 
 192. Compare Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163, 177–87 (2d Cir. 2009) (majority holding that the 
norm against nonconsensual medical experimentation was universal, specific, and obligatory), with id. 
at 194–95 (Wesley, J., dissenting) (contending that the norm was not enforceable against private actors 
under customary international law). 
 193. See id. at 182 (majority opinion) (noting that the norm has been embedded in U.S. law for 
forty-five years, and citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)). 
 194. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 26 (concluding that the U.S. faces the highest sovereignty costs 
from complying with CIL because of its predominant geopolitical position). 
 195. Cf. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1226 (noting the difficulty of political branch 
override given the numerous veto points in enacting legislation). 
 196. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 27; Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 466–68. 
 197. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 36–39; Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 472–73; McGinnis & 
Somin, Political Economy, supra note 4, at 1. 
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odds with U.S. strategic interests.
198
 Revisionists point out that crucial 
U.S. allies, such as Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Pakistan, 
often have troubling human rights records.
199
 ATS lawsuits against 
government officials or citizens of these allies, or potential rivals like 
China, could produce resentment against perceived meddling in their 
internal affairs.
200
 This resentment could in turn impose additional costs on 
the pursuit of U.S. strategic goals. Curtis Bradley argues that ATS 
litigation has an incremental effect, creating ―[s]trains in international 
relationships‖ that ―may undermine a variety of cooperative ventures, 
ranging from trade, to environmental protection, to the war on drugs, to 
arms control, to combating terrorism.‖201  
In addition, critics argue that ATS litigation imposes, or will impose, 
significant economic costs on the United States.
202
 In the event of 
judgments against foreign governments, private U.S.-based lenders and 
insurers of those countries‘ debts face exposure. Judgments against 
corporations with U.S. ties doing business in other countries will prompt 
disinvestment, dampening commerce. Other companies not reachable 
through ATS litigation will fill the gap, leaving U.S. companies at a 
disadvantage and harming U.S. competitiveness.
203
  
These predictions could turn out to be true, but there is little evidence 
that ATS litigation has thus far produced significant economic and 
security costs. Until the Bush administration, the executive branch 
generally supported, or was indifferent to, ATS litigation.
204
 In 1997, a 
California district court asked the Clinton administration about the foreign 
 
 
 198. Abebe, supra note 4, at 29; Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 467; McGinnis & Somin, 
Political Economy, supra note 4, at 1. 
 199. Abebe, supra note 4, at 30–31. 
 200. Id. at 33–34. 
 201. Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 460. 
 202. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 203. Id. at 13–17; see, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Council for Int‘l Bus., Business Groups Urge 
Supreme Court to Curtail Abuse of Alien Tort Statute (Jan. 23, 2004), available at http://www.uscib. 
org/index.asp?documentID=2815 (quoting Thomas Niles, president of the United States Council for 
International Business: ―Misuse of the Alien Tort Statute has begun to spin out of control in the federal 
courts. Not only does this clog up our judicial system, it threatens to make it virtually impossible for 
companies, foreign or American, to invest anywhere in the world for fear that they will be subjected to 
frivolous lawsuits in U.S. courts‖). 
 204. In Filartiga, the Carter administration, in amicus, supported the litigation as consistent with 
America‘s responsibility to promote human rights internationally. See Memorandum for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090) 
(―Like many other areas affecting international relations, the protection of fundamental human rights is 
not committed exclusively to the political branches of government.‖). See generally Beth Stephens, 
Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration‟s Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 
17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169 (2004). 
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affairs implications of the Unocal case, and the administration indicated 
that ―adjudication of the claims based on allegations of torture and slavery 
would not prejudice or impede the conduct of U.S. foreign relations with 
the current government of Burma.‖205 In 2001, however, the Bush 
administration changed course, filing a new statement of interest in 
Unocal objecting to the lawsuit, the start of a generally disapproving 
approach toward ATS litigation.
206
 This approach may have been driven in 
part by ideology and strong views of executive branch primacy.
207
 But 
there are functionalist justifications for the change in attitude toward ATS 
lawsuits, which in the 1980s and most of the 1990s ―involved abuses 
committed under regimes that were defunct and repudiated by their 
successors, nearly universally shunned by other governments, possessed 
of, at best, uncertain claims to statehood or legitimate state power, lacking 
in geopolitical significance, politically unimportant to Washington, or 
clearly condemned by the United States.‖208 The first decade of the 
twenty-first century, by contrast, has seen a wave of ATS lawsuits against 
corporations and existing regimes that have prompted complaints from 
some foreign governments, including U.S. allies.
209
 
The actual effect of ATS litigation on U.S. strategic interests is a very 
complex empirical question that deserves comprehensive attention, but is a 
project well beyond the scope of this Article. However, it is worth looking 
at two examples of recent ATS litigation with the greatest potential to 
affect U.S. interests abroad.  
The first example involves lawsuits against Chinese officials for human 
rights abuses, which present a critical case study for determining the 
foreign policy costs of ATS litigation.
210
 China has the most important and 
 
 
 205. Nat‘l Coal. Gov‘t of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 335 (C.D. Cal. 
1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 206. See Supplemental Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 11–15, Doe I 
v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628). 
 207. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 124–44. 
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(2002). 
 209. See John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien 
Tort Statute And Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 1, 8 (2007) (former counsel to 
Secretary of State, explaining that other countries see the U.S. ―as something of a rogue actor‖ because 
of ATS litigation); see, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010); Abdullahi v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that a case against Pfizer alleging 
nonconsensual medical experimentation on children in Nigeria could go forward under the ATS); Sarei 
v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 210. See, e.g., Zhou v. Peng, 286 F. Supp. 2d 255, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Ge v. Peng, 201 F. Supp. 
2d 14, 17 (D.D.C. 2000). 
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perhaps the most volatile bilateral relationship with the United States.
211
 
China is a rising power and, some argue, a potential rival for geopolitical 
dominance.
212
 Due to its role as a major U.S. creditor, China holds some 
leverage over U.S. foreign policy.
213
 Moreover, China may be particularly 
sensitive to ATS litigation. The governing Communist Party of China 
(CPC) has proven especially skillful at invoking the long history of 
imperialism and abuses by Western countries to stoke the fires of 
nationalism and resentment against the United States.
214
 ATS litigation is 
arguably more likely to impose substantial foreign policy costs in this 
context than in any other. 
Only five ATS lawsuits have been brought concerning activities in 
China. Three were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, one ended in 
settlement, and one resulted in a declaratory judgment with no damages 
awarded. One suit was brought by student leaders of the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square protests against Li Peng, the former Premier of China, for alleged 
human rights abuses.
215
 Former prisoners also brought suit against Li 
Peng, various state entities, and the Adidas Corporation for human rights 
abuses, including forced prison labor.
216
 Although the service of the 
complaint on Li Peng during a visit to the United States prompted angry 
denunciations from the Chinese government, both claims against 
government officials were dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds.
217
 
Three other cases arose from the 1999 crackdown by the Chinese 
government on the Falun Gong spiritual movement.
218
 Falun Gong 
practitioners filed lawsuits against three Chinese government officials, 
including former President Jiang Zemin, the Beijing Mayor, Deputy 
Governor of Liaoning Province, and the Chinese Communist Party 
Secretary for Sichuan Province.
219
 Two cases were dismissed on sovereign 
 
 
 211. deLisle, supra note 208, at 492. 
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immunity grounds.
220
 In another, Doe v. Qi, the defendant refused to 
appear and the court issued a declaratory judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs without awarding damages because it ―pose[d] the least threat to 
foreign relations.‖221 More recently, in 2007, several Chinese dissidents 
sued Yahoo! under the ATS, alleging that the internet company had 
supplied information to the Chinese government about the dissidents, 
which led to their arrest, imprisonment, and torture.
222
 No Chinese 
government officials were sued. Yahoo! has settled one of the suits for an 
undisclosed sum.
223
 
The U.S. State Department filed statements of interest in these cases on 
behalf of the defendant Chinese officials, arguing that the litigation would 
interfere with the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.
224
 For its part, the 
Chinese government complained to the court that the lawsuit would cause 
―immeasurable interferences‖225 to U.S.-China relations, denounced the 
lawsuits in public, and complained to executive branch officials in private 
meetings.
226
 But what actual foreign policy impact did the ATS cases 
have? The lawsuits ended without requiring anything tangible from the 
Chinese defendants. On the other hand, even the filing of a lawsuit against 
foreign officials arguably implicates foreign policy.
227
 The service of 
papers on Chinese officials while in the United States caused irritation and 
tirades.
228
 The declaratory judgment in Doe v. Qi, and even the fact that 
U.S. law permits courts to entertain the ATS claims in the first place, 
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2004) (No. C02-0672), available at http://www.cja.org/downloads/LiuQi_Statement_of_Interest 
_of_the_US_85.pdf; Statement of Interest of the United States at 2–3, Zhou v. Peng, 286 F. Supp. 2d 
255 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 00 Civ. 6446), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
16671.pdf (arguing that the Tiananmen Square litigation ―severely hampers the ability of the United 
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could be said to cause dignitary harm and Chinese resentment of the 
United States.
229
  
But in the end, there is no empirical evidence that the Chinese 
government altered any policy toward the United States because of the 
lawsuits or that ATS litigation persists as a diplomatic problem. Nor is 
there evidence that ATS litigation is a significant motivation for 
anti-American sentiment among the Chinese population.  
Indeed, there could be several reasons why the ATS lawsuits involving 
China had little effect. A pure realist perspective offers a straightforward 
answer: the Chinese government is, like the United States, a rational actor 
pursuing material interests. If it serves China‘s interests for it to retaliate 
against the U.S. for ATS litigation, it will do so; otherwise, it won‘t. China 
may have calculated that it was not worth the cost of taking substantive 
action beyond diplomatic protestations and stern letters. The 
Sino-American relationship is dense and involves interaction on a broad 
range of subjects at multiple levels. Given that both governments have 
bigger fish to fry, it seems unlikely that these lawsuits have caused any 
significant friction. Moreover, Chinese government officials are savvy 
enough to view the ATS lawsuits through the lens of the operation of the 
U.S. separation of powers rather than as intrusive action by a unitary U.S. 
government.
230
 In addition, the allegations against Chinese officials and 
the declaratory judgment in Qi do not depart significantly from 
assessments about human rights in China already made by the U.S. 
executive branch through the State Department‘s Country Reports.231 U.S. 
courts have also made negative assessments about China‘s human rights 
record in other litigation, such as asylum cases.
232
 If China wishes to 
retaliate for being accused of violating human rights norms, it already 
would be doing so absent ATS litigation. Finally, China actually stands to 
benefit in some respects from ATS litigation. Chinese citizens can sue 
foreign corporations or government officials for human rights violations 
without requiring the Chinese government to address the human rights 
issue.
233
  
 
 
 229. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 37–38. 
 230. deLisle, supra note 208, at 546 & n.211 (listing examples of Chinese government officials 
discussing the U.S. separation of powers and lobbying the executive branch to overturn court 
decisions). 
 231. See id. at 501–02. 
 232. See id.  
 233. See id. at 495–96 (noting the favorable treatment in the Chinese press regarding an ATS 
lawsuit by Chinese citizens against the government of Japan for sexual abuse during World War II). 
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In sum, it is very difficult to conclude that ATS litigation against 
Chinese defendants has had any significant effect on U.S. foreign policy. 
This suggests that courts are capable of managing ATS litigation in a 
manner that avoids imposing costs on the pursuit of U.S. strategic interests 
abroad, at least to the extent that ATS litigation risks antagonizing rival 
great powers. Each bilateral relationship is unique, of course, and the value 
of China as a critical case study is open to debate. 
What about antagonizing U.S. allies? In 2002, a group of South African 
citizens sued several multinational corporations under the ATS, including 
Ford, Daimler, IBM, Fujitsu, and two international banks that did business 
with the South African government during Apartheid.
234
 The alleged 
harms included discriminatory employment practices, arbitrary 
denationalization, torture, and extrajudicial killing.
235
 These controversial 
lawsuits are frequently mentioned as a prime example of ATS litigation 
interfering with the conduct of foreign relations and sparking resentment 
in target countries for meddling in their internal affairs.
236
 The United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, and Australia, whose corporations were sued by 
the South African plaintiffs, voiced their opposition to the litigation.
237
 
The U.S. and South African governments initially argued that the cases 
should be dismissed, but the South African government has since switched 
its position to support the lawsuit, and the Obama administration‘s 
position is unclear.
238
 
 
 
 234. The district court granted the defendants‘ motion to dismiss in November 2004. See Ntsebeza 
v. Citigroup, Inc. (In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig.), 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff‟d in 
part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat‘l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d 
Cir. 2007). The Bush administration had urged that it be dismissed, citing, in part, these economic 
concerns. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. After a partial reversal and remand by the 
Second Circuit, the Supreme Court granted certiorari but affirmed by default for lack of a quorum, due 
to recusal by justices. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). On remand, the 
district court narrowed the claims but allowed the case to continue against Daimler, Ford, General 
Motors, IBM, and Rheinmetall Group. See Ntsebeza v. Daimler AG (In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig.), 
617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 235. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 255.  
 236. See, e.g., John B. Bellinger III, The U.S. Can‟t Be the World‟s Court, WALL ST. J., May 27, 
2009, at A19.  
 237. Australia, Switzerland, and the U.K. objected to the Apartheid litigation in an amicus brief in 
Sosa. Brief for Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Swiss Confederation, and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petitioner, 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339) [hereinafter Brief of the Governments of 
the Commonwealth of Australia], available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/docs/sva19.pdf. 
 238. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 1–2, Ntsebeza v. 
Daimler AG (In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig.), 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-2778-CV), 
available at http://viewfromll2.files.wordpress.com/2009/12/soisouthafricanapartheid litigation.pdf 
(declining to support an interlocutory appeal, under the collateral order doctrine, from the district 
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Yet there is no evidence that the litigation has so far resulted in 
disinvestment or harmed the U.S. relationship with its allies who 
intervened against the lawsuit. It is difficult to see how ATS litigation 
could disincentivize current investment in South Africa. As long as South 
Africa remains a democratic state that does not repress its citizens, 
corporations will not risk ATS liability for their present or future 
activities. Nor, for that matter, will disinvestment have any effect on 
corporations‘ liability for Apartheid-era activities.239 It is possible, of 
course, that the litigation in South Africa, and other similar lawsuits, could 
discourage corporations from investing in other nations with poor human 
rights records for fear of liability.
240
 This is an empirical question, and no 
study has attempted to determine the weight MNCs actually give to ATS 
litigation in general as a factor in making global investment decisions. 
And the critics‘ concern assumes, of course, that MNCs will do business 
with a regime that is currently engaged in human rights violations to the 
point that it could be considered aiding and abetting. It costs nothing for 
MNCs to claim that ATS litigation is a factor in their decisions, but money 
speaks louder than words and investment continues apparently unabated. 
Regardless of ATS litigation‘s effects on human rights—which critics 
and defenders dispute
241—disinvestment in nations with poor human rights 
records does not necessarily harm U.S. strategic interests. Critics of ATS 
litigation invoke U.S. security and economic interests, but they are not 
synonymous with the interests of foreign citizens who might benefit from 
the investment or, for that matter, from the interests of U.S.-based MNCs, 
who might suffer from the inability to invest in potential ATS target 
countries but might just as profitably invest their money elsewhere. The 
most compelling observation by revisionists is that MNCs lacking the 
contacts with the United States necessary for personal jurisdiction would 
be able to invest without consequences, while MNCs with U.S. ties would 
be disadvantaged by potential liability.
242
 In short, ATS litigation increases 
the cost of doing business in the United States.  
In the end, however, there is simply no significant empirical evidence 
that the United States has borne economic costs from ATS litigation. Gary 
 
 
court‘s order denying defendant‘s motion to dismiss, and arguing that the U.S. government had never 
explicitly requested dismissal). 
 239. See Affidavit of Joseph Stiglitz, South African Apartheid Litigation (on file with author).  
 240. This was the argument made by the Bush administration in its 2007 Statement of Interest. See 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellees at 21, Khulumani v. 
Barclay Nat. Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 05-2141-CV).  
 241. I address the human rights costs and benefits in Part II.C.3. 
 242. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 4, at 41–42. 
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Clyde Hufbauer and Nicholas Mitrokostas predicted in 2003 that ATS 
litigation could depress worldwide U.S. trade by 10%, lead to a loss of 
25% of foreign direct investment in target countries, and cost the United 
States hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs.
243
 But these 
catastrophic predictions—including a ―nightmare‖ scenario of a $26 
billion class action by 100,000 Chinese plaintiffs within the decade—have 
not materialized. Again, there is no evidence that companies have actually 
disinvested due to the ATS litigation that has occurred. Yahoo! sold its 
Chinese subsidiary before the lawsuits were filed but retains a 40% 
interest in the purchaser.
244
 Shell and Chevron have continued to make 
multiyear, multibillion dollar investments in Nigeria despite defending 
ATS lawsuits concerning their activities in that country.
245
 Because almost 
all multinational corporations operating in developing countries are 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction and reachable by ATS litigation, there are 
relatively few nonreachable companies able to step in.
246
  
Why has the ATS failed after 30 years to cause an economic 
earthquake unsettling the global trading system? The gloomiest 
predictions assume that governments will face staggering judgments and 
that corporations can be held liable merely for doing business in a target 
country.
247
 But these assumptions do not reflect the reality of ATS 
litigation as it has actually unfolded. Merely investing in a country that has 
an authoritarian regime has never been sufficient ground for liability under 
the ATS.
248
 In fact, corporate aiding and abetting liability is becoming 
more difficult to prove. In 2010, the Second Circuit—which, along with 
 
 
 243. See id. at 38–40. 
 244. Yahoo Chief Apologizes to Chinese Dissidents‟ Relatives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/07/business/worldbusiness/07iht-yahoo.1.8226586.html. 
 245. See Herz, supra note 6, at 212. Talisman Energy, a Canadian corporation, sold its interest in 
the Sudan oil pipeline project in 2002, but a senior manager at the company, without reference to the 
ATS, attributed the decision to a public relations campaign mounted by its critics resulting in a bill 
introduced in Congress that would have delisted Talisman from the New York Stock Exchange. Reg 
Manhas, Talisman in Sudan: Impacts of Divestment (Mar. 16, 2007), http://www.enewsbuilder.net/ 
globalcompact/e_article000775162.cfm?x=b11,0,w. 
 246. See Michael Barsa & David Dana, Three Obstacles to the Promotion of Corporate Social 
Responsibility by Means of the Alien Tort Claims Act: The Sosa Court‟s Incoherent Conception of the 
Law of Nations, the “Purposive” Action Requirement for Aiding and Abetting, and the State Action 
Requirement for Primary Liability, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 79 (2010). As Barsa and Dana 
observe, even if companies not subject to U.S. jurisdiction step in, the threat of disinvestment by 
companies subject to U.S. jurisdiction is likely to give target countries an incentive to improve human 
rights conditions because reduced competition will lead to fewer benefits for the target country. See id. 
This would, in turn, make it more likely that companies subject to U.S. jurisdiction would maintain 
investment. 
 247. See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 248. Herz, supra note 6, at 210. 
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the Ninth Circuit, is considered to be the most friendly to ATS plaintiffs—
held, in a surprising decision, that jurisdiction under the ATS did not 
extend to lawsuits against corporations at all.
249
  
Without a doubt, the Supreme Court‘s recognition in Sosa that crafting 
remedies for new CIL norms ―would raise risks of adverse foreign policy 
consequences‖ has led to restraint by judges in subsequent ATS cases.250 
Facing a high bar for success under the ATS, plaintiffs and their attorneys 
are relatively more selective in filing lawsuits than they otherwise would 
have been.
251
 
ATS litigation could, in the future, threaten to impose serious foreign 
policy costs. But one cannot presume that federal courts will ignore 
specific evidence of those costs presented to them, or that the political 
branches will be unwilling to intervene if necessary through legislative 
override. The courts have thus far managed litigation without imposing 
such costs. Why will they not continue to do so in the future? And further, 
should courts actually ―go rogue,‖ there are few reasons to think that 
Congress and the President will reign in ATS litigation if they think it 
necessary for the national interest. National security concerns motivated 
swift passage of the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military 
Commissions Act in response to Supreme Court decisions in 2004 and 
2006.
252
 Multinational corporations, for good or ill, have enormous ability 
 
 
 249. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). The decision was surprising 
to observers because other courts had held the opposite, and the Second Circuit had decided earlier 
ATS cases against corporations while assuming that corporations could be liable. See id. at 124; 
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009) (―In addition to private individual 
liability, we have also recognized corporate defendants are subject to liability under the ATS and may 
be liable for violations of the law of nations.‖ (citing Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 
1315 (11th Cir.2008))); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that aiding 
and abetting liability against a corporation can be proven if the defendant provided ―knowing practical 
assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime‖); Al-
Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 753 (D. Md. 2010) (―There is no basis for differentiating 
between private individuals and corporations [under the ATS] . . . .‖). 
 250. See Stephens, supra note 55, at 18 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727–28 
(2004)). 
 251. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 97–98. 
 252. The Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001–1005, 119 Stat. 2680, 
2739–44 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. 
(2006)), purported to strip habeas jurisdiction for Guantánamo detainees and replace it with exclusive, 
but limited, review of Combatant Status Review Tribunal proceedings in the D.C. Circuit. The DTA 
was in part a response to Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004), which held that alien detainees at 
Guantánamo had a statutory right to invoke habeas jurisdiction. Id. The Military Commissions Act 
(MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950w and scattered 
sections of 10 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2006)), inter alia, reestablished the 
military commissions and eliminated habeas corpus for all aliens designated as ―enemy combatants‖ or 
awaiting a determination of that status. The MCA was a response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557, 567 (2006), which declared as unlawful the military commissions established to try certain enemy 
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to spur the passage of legislation when their interests are seriously 
threatened. 
3. Human Rights Costs 
Revisionists acknowledge that nations like the United States will, from 
time to time, rationally pursue human rights as a preference.
253
 From a 
realist perspective, however, human rights will (and normatively, must) 
ultimately take a back seat to more important material interests, primarily 
security.
254
 Indeed, while the United States has long professed that the 
increased global observance of human rights is an important foreign policy 
goal, it has often allied itself with repressive regimes to advance other 
interests.
255
 The revisionist critique assumes that the only instrumental use 
of ATS litigation is to further the U.S. interest in the establishment of a 
global human rights regime. Professors Ku and Yoo speculate that the 
purpose of the ATS is to advance the development of international human 
rights law.
256
 Professor Abebe associates ATS litigation with the 
―normative project to judicialize international politics, integrate 
international law into domestic legal systems, and promote progressive 
change.‖257 Their revisionist critique focuses on the conflict between these 
progressive goals and the positive reality of an international system 
sensitive to power.  
But revisionists also advance another objection: that ATS litigation 
fails to achieve its purpose of promoting adherence to human rights 
principles.
258
 Indeed, by focusing on only the human rights benefits and 
the realist and security costs, revisionists can argue that ATS litigation is 
simultaneously ineffectual and capable of creating havoc. Revisionists 
point to the low number of collectable damage awards as evidence that 
ATS litigation fails to bring restitution to victims of human rights abuses 
while making international law seem empty.
259
 Yet even judgments for the 
plaintiffs, revisionists argue, are not likely to result in the internalization of 
international human rights law in target countries. Instead, ATS litigation 
 
 
combatants for war crimes and held that the courts retained habeas jurisdiction over claims filed by 
Guantánamo detainees before the DTA took effect. Id. 
 253. Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 118, at 463. 
 254. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 29–32. 
 255. See id. 
 256. Ku & Yoo, Beyond Formalism, supra note 4, at 116–18; see also Abebe, supra note 4, at 25. 
 257. Abebe, supra note 4, at 15. 
 258. See McGinnis & Somin, Political Economy, supra note 4, at 38–40; see also Abebe, supra 
note 4, at 26. 
 259. Abebe, supra note 4, at 45–46. 
  
 
 
 
 
1160 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:1117 
 
 
 
 
is more likely to make international law appear as the instrument of 
neocolonialism by a foreign power whose government officials are 
shielded by sovereign immunity from similar accountability. Finally, the 
availability of ATS litigation will tend to discourage the development of 
local justice.
260
  
These adverse human rights consequences seem entirely plausible, but 
they are difficult to measure, and there is plenty of countervailing 
evidence. Although approximately only two dozen ATS suits have 
survived to judgment and collectable damage awards have been few,
261
 
corporate defendants have begun to settle some high-visibility ATS suits. 
In 2009, ―pharmaceutical manufacturer Pfizer reached a settlement with 
the plaintiffs in a multibillion dollar ATS suit by numerous Nigerian 
children and their guardians. The plaintiffs alleged that the company 
conducted illegal clinical trials of . . . an experimental meningitis 
medication[] on [the] children . . . without approval by Nigeria or the 
children‘s parents.‖262 Pfizer settled after the Second Circuit held that 
nonconsensual experimentation was a CIL norm actionable under the 
ATS.
263
 The same year, a $15.5 million settlement was reached on the eve 
of trial in a long-running suit against ―Royal Dutch Shell, its Nigerian 
subsidiary, and the former head of Shell‘s Nigerian operations [for] 
complicit[y] in murder, torture, and other crimes in connection with 
Shell‘s operations in the Niger Delta.‖264 And, as mentioned above, 
Yahoo! recently settled a suit brought by Chinese dissidents.
265
 Such 
 
 
 260. See id. Professors McGinnis and Somin add the additional argument that the prospect of 
losing all ill-gotten wealth through ATS litigation encourages dictators to hold onto power longer so 
that they can continue to enjoy sovereign immunity. See McGinnis & Somin, Political Economy, supra 
note 4, at 39–40. Former government officials are not generally protected by sovereign immunity. See, 
e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2282 (2010) (holding that the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act did not shield a former Somali government official from ATS and TVPA lawsuits by 
Somali citizens alleging torture and human rights violations committed while the defendant was in 
government). 
 261. As of 2010, two judgments were awarded against a corporate defendant and twenty-two 
cases resulted in judgments against non-corporate defendants, thirteen of which were default 
judgments. See Susan Simpson & Michael Williams, Alien Tort Statute Cases Resulting in Plaintiff 
Victories, THE VIEW FROM LL2 (Nov. 11, 2009), available at http://viewfromll2.com/2009/11/11/ 
alien-tort-statute-cases-resulting-in-plaintiff-victories/. 
 262. John R. Crook, Major Corporations Settle Alien Tort Statute Cases Following Adverse 
Appellate Rulings, 103 AM. J. INT‘L L. 592, 592 (2009). 
 263. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009); Joe Stephens, Suits Saying Pfizer 
Experimented on Nigerian Children Are Revived, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2009, at A7. 
 264. Crook, supra note 262, at 593. The claims focused on Shell‘s alleged role in Nigeria‘s 1995 
execution of Nigerian activist and writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists opposed to 
Shell's environmental practices in the delta. See Jad Mouawad, Shell Agrees to Settle Abuse Case for 
Millions, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, at B1. 
 265. Rampell, supra note 223. 
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settlements may not carry the same weight as jury verdicts, but they 
provide some indication to the populations in target countries that MNCs 
can be held accountable under international law. 
Indeed, there is much evidence that ATS litigation improves the 
reputation of the United States and temporarily fills in gaps in the justice 
systems of target countries.
266
 Harry Akoh concluded from a study of the 
ramifications of ATS litigation in Africa against both corporations and 
government officials ―that the ATS has enhanced the image of the United 
States as a purveyor of human rights‖ and that many Africans ―have a 
sincere appreciation for the United States as a place where they can seek 
justice against those who would otherwise never be challenged in their 
own countries.‖267 Dolly Filartiga wrote that her ATS suit provided an 
otherwise unavailable means of accountability and brought attention to the 
atrocities of the Stroessner regime in Paraguay, where her brother became 
a martyr for human rights.
268
  
Because of the higher bar for identifying specific, universal, and 
obligatory human rights norms, ATS suits are more likely to target activity 
in nations with repressive regimes, where justice systems are 
underdeveloped and accountability for human rights abuses—against both 
government officials and MNCs—is lacking. Lawsuits against MNCs are 
unlikely to provoke resentment or allegations of neocolonialism in such 
contexts because MNCs are themselves viewed by much of the population 
as foreign, and sometimes even hostile, elements, particularly if they aid 
and abet human rights abuses.
269
  
It is possible that ATS litigation could tend to discourage the 
development of local justice and accountability for human rights violations 
by interfering with domestic processes already underway, opening old 
wounds by reviving resolved conflicts, or giving plaintiffs an alternative 
and more attractive means of obtaining relief.
270
 On the other hand, it 
seems equally plausible that ATS litigation could spur the development of 
local justice by emulation.
271
 It may do all of these things, depending on 
the target country. The empirical evidence is, again, indeterminate.
272
  
 
 
 266. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 1, at 124–32. 
 267. AKOH, supra note 6, at 248. 
 268. Dolly Filartiga, American Courts, Global Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at A21; see 
also Harold Hongju Koh, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala: Judicial Internalization into Domestic Law of the 
Customary International Law Norm Against Torture, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 45 (John E. 
Noyes, Laura A. Dickinson & Mark W. Janis eds., 2007). 
 269. See Holzmeyer, supra note 120, at 280. 
 270. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 35; Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 465. 
 271. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1222 (9th Cir. 2007) (―An alternative and 
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The conflicting incentives for target countries are evident in South 
Africa‘s complex response to the Apartheid lawsuit. Although some 
prominent South Africans, such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, supported 
the litigation, the Mbeke administration objected, arguing to the court that 
it infringed on South Africa‘s sovereign right to resolve Apartheid-era 
issues through the truth and reconciliation process and would hurt foreign 
direct investment in South Africa.
273
 However, in 2009, the new 
administration, led by President Joseph Zuma, reversed course and 
supported the ATS litigation.
274
  
In the event that there is a genuine risk that ATS litigation will interfere 
with local remedies, the courts can adjust. Following the Supreme Court‘s 
hint in Sosa, the Ninth Circuit indicated that district courts should impose 
exhaustion requirements in ATS litigation.
275
 This rule, if followed in 
other circuits, would limit interference with ongoing local litigation in 
most cases. 
Revisionists and the U.S. government have also argued that ATS 
litigation against corporations harms target countries by causing 
disinvestment, resulting in lost opportunities for MNCs to reinforce human 
rights norms through constructive engagement.
276
 This argument again 
assumes, without evidence, that MNCs would forsake investment 
opportunities were they not allowed to aid and abet violations of 
Sosa-threshold CIL norms. Moreover, as John Herz has argued, 
constructive engagement cannot be effective if MNCs are involved in 
violating the very human rights norms they seek to promote.
277
 
 
 
perhaps equally plausible hypothesis is that ‗foreign court rulings against rights-abusing defendants 
have the effect of putting pressure ―from above‖ on the state where the rights abuses occurred.‘‖ 
(quoting Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Human 
Rights Trials in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 1, 4 (2001))); Herz, supra note 6, at 208–09. 
 272. Herz, supra note 6, at 208–09. 
 273. Compare Declaration from Penuell Mpapa Maduna, South African Minister of Justice, to 
Judge John E. Sprizzo (July 11, 2001), with Supplemental Declaration in Opposition to Defendants‘ 
Joint Motion to Dismiss by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, In re South Africa Apartheid Litigation, MDL 
1499, 02-MD-1499, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13797 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003). 
 274. See Letter from Jeffrey Thamsanqa Radebe, Minister of Justice & Constitutional Dev., S. 
Afr., to the Honorable Shira Scheindlin, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., available at 
http://viewfromll2.files.wordpress.com/2009/12/radebeletter.pdf. 
 275. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 825 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (―As a prudential matter, 
in this case there is a certain logic to considering exhaustion before considering threshold grounds that 
may ‗deny[] audience to a case on the merits.‘‖ (quoting Sinochem Int‘l Co. v. Malaysia Int‘l Shipping 
Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007))). 
 276. See generally Herz, supra note 6. 
 277. Id. at 21. 
  
 
 
 
 
2011] A REALIST DEFENSE 1163 
 
 
 
 
III. THE STRATEGIC BENEFITS OF ATS LITIGATION 
While the revisionist critique focuses on the economic and security 
costs of ATS litigation, its defenders have, for the most part, focused on 
describing its benefits for the enforcement of human rights norms and the 
rule of law.
278
 These are normatively attractive objectives regardless of 
their benefit for the United States. And, to the extent that the United States 
pursues these interests for its own sake, the traditional defense of ATS 
litigation offers a response to the revisionist critique on its own terms.
279
 
Nonetheless, this response is radically incomplete and leaves ATS 
litigation quite vulnerable to realist claims that it undermines U.S. security 
interests. In this section, I describe the strategic benefits of ATS litigation.  
A. The ATS‟s Strategic Purpose in 1789 
The present emphasis on the ATS as a vehicle for the global 
judicialization of modern human rights norms obscures its likely original 
purpose. The ATS in fact owes its existence to U.S. geopolitical interests 
and realist ends. The scant evidence available suggests that the ATS was 
enacted to help protect U.S. neutrality in a 1789 world dominated by 
stronger European powers.
280
 For the most part, early American foreign 
policy was isolationist, seeking to avoid entanglements with the European 
powers that had been warring for centuries.
281
 The separation of powers 
itself was designed in part, or at least served, to institutionalize America‘s 
diplomatic isolation.
282
 The federal courts contributed to this effort. 
Professor David Sloss has demonstrated, in a study of early Supreme 
Court cases and related materials, that the federal courts played an active 
role in implementing U.S. neutrality policy during the 1790s by providing 
 
 
 278. See supra notes 115–26 and accompanying text. 
 279. But cf. Lee, supra note 42, at 907 (arguing that limiting ATS litigation to safe-conduct 
offenses would produce national security benefits and that ―it is entirely consistent with the original 
purpose of the ATS to see it as a means to deploy the federal courts in the service of a national security 
policy in the best interests of the American people‖ (emphasis added)). 
 280. Anthony D‘Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. 
INT‘L L. 62, 63 (1988); Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 
VAND. L. REV. 819, 839 (1989) (―The primary consideration that forced the United States to pay 
respect to the law of nations was the country‘s weakness in relation to the European powers.‖); Lee, 
supra note 42, at 849.  
 281. HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 36 (1994). 
 282. See id.; Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive 
Agreements, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 678–79 (1998).  
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a non-executive-branch forum for the resolution of disputes involving 
privateers.
283
  
Two incidents involving assaults on foreign citizens during the 1780s 
in the United States likely underscored the need for an ATS. In 
Philadelphia, a French citizen named Chevalier De Longchamps—
described by Thomas Jefferson as an ―obscure and worthless 
character‖284—had attacked the Secretary of the French Legation at the 
house of the French Ambassador and later assaulted the Secretary on the 
street.
285
 The U.S. government lacked the authority to punish Longchamps 
and suffered diplomatic humiliation and some international outrage while 
waiting for Pennsylvania to prosecute him.
286
 In the second incident, a 
police officer entered the house of the Dutch ambassador in New York and 
arrested him, allegedly without cause.
287
 The ambassador complained to 
Secretary of State John Jay, who lamented the lack of a federal remedy.
288
 
But such risks to American neutrality were not created only by incidents in 
the United States. After the enactment of the ATS, Attorney General 
William Bradford opined that British property owners in Sierra Leone 
could seek damages for harm to their property inflicted during a raid by 
French privateers assisted by U.S. slavers.
289
  
Of course, the fact that the ATS almost immediately fell into 
hibernation suggests that it was not deemed a very useful tool for serving 
its neutrality-preserving purpose. But its mere existence may have 
provided some reassurance. 
Some revisionists, taking cues from ATS supporters, see the modern 
post-Filartiga purpose of the ATS as promoting the development and 
enforcement of international law.
290
 They see this modern purpose as 
working against the ATS‘s original purpose by interfering in the internal 
affairs of foreign nations.
291
 But none have considered that the ATS may 
serve a beneficial strategic function today. 
 
 
 283. See generally David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 145 (2008).  
 284. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 25, 1784), reprinted in 7 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 288–89 (J. Boyd ed., 1953). 
 285. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 617–18 (discussing the incident). 
 286. See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts‟  Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in 
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 489, 491–94 (1986). 
 287. See id. 
 288. Secretary for Foreign Aff. Rep. on the Compl. of Minister of United Netherlands (Mar. 25, 
1788), reprinted in 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 109, 111 (1788). 
 289. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att‘y Gen. 57 (1795). 
 290. See Ku & Yoo, Beyond Formalism, supra note 4, at 179–80. 
 291. Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 463. 
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B. The ATS‟s Twenty-First Century Strategic Function 
How can this strategic purpose of the ATS be made meaningful in 
today‘s world? The optimal strategies for a weak power pursuing 
neutrality in an eighteenth-century international system dominated by 
overseas powers are, of course, different from those of a lone superpower 
providing public goods in a twenty-first-century world transformed by 
globalization. However, the persistence of ATS litigation, despite this 
criticism, suggests not only that the interference argument is overblown, 
but also that ATS litigation may serve the contemporary strategic goals of 
the United States in slightly different, though related, ways.  
A realist assessment of ATS litigation‘s costs and benefits must take 
into account the unique role of the United States in the world, which IR 
scholars disagree about how best to define. The United States has been 
variously described as the lone superpower, a hyperpower,
292
 a 
hegemon,
293
 and an empire.
294
 These descriptions have long coexisted with 
predictions of more or less imminent U.S. decline.
295
 In the first half of the 
2000s, the already vast United-States-as-empire literature bloomed on both 
ends of the political spectrum, in part as a response to the more aggressive 
foreign policies of the Bush administration following 9/11.
296
 During the 
second half of the decade, however, the narrative of U.S. decline, and the 
rise of its rivals, has gained momentum.
297
 Many of these disagreements 
result from semantic differences and loose use of the term ―empire.‖298 In 
addition, assessments of the U.S. global position will vary, depending on 
 
 
 292. See, e.g., Elliot A. Cohen, History and the Hyperpower, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 49 (2004). 
 293. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY (1996) (arguing that American hegemony 
is a form of international governance and must be evaluated by liberals in the same way they would 
evaluate the legitimacy of domestic political arrangements). 
 294. Nexon & Wright, supra note 9, at 253 (observing that scholars on both the left and right 
describe the U.S. as an empire); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq, 82 FOREIGN 
AFF. 60, 60 (2003) (same). 
 295. See MEARSHEIMER, supra note 109, at 381 (arguing that regional hegemons will arise to 
challenge American dominance); see also PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT 
POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987) (predicting, in the 
first 1987 edition, the decline of the United States). 
 296. See, e.g., NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 
(2004); CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY, AND THE END OF 
THE REPUBLIC (2004). 
 297. See, e.g., PARAG KHANNA, THE SECOND WORLD: EMPIRES AND INFLUENCE IN THE NEW 
GLOBAL ORDER (2008); FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORLD (2008) [hereinafter 
ZAKARIA, POST-AMERICAN]. 
 298. See, e.g., Nexon & Wright, supra note 9, at 253. 
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the importance one places, respectively, on military, economic, and soft 
power.
299
 
But a few relatively noncontroversial insights from IR theory can serve 
as the foundation for an assessment of ATS litigation‘s strategic benefits. 
First, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has lacked 
global balancing rivals in the traditional realist sense: it is the only nation 
capable of projecting military power anywhere in the world.
300
 In this 
respect, the United States is the sole superpower and the global system is 
unipolar.  
There are several reasons why this is likely to continue for some time. 
First, the United States is geographically isolated from other potential 
rivals, who are located near one another in Eurasia.
301
 This mutes the 
security threat that the United States seems to pose, while increasing the 
threats that potential rivals seem to pose to one another.
302
 Second, the 
United States far exceeds the capabilities of all other states in terms of 
military and, for the time being, economic power. This advantage ―is 
larger now than any analogous gap in the history of the modern states 
system.‖303 Finally, the potential rivals‘ possession of nuclear weapons 
makes the concentration of power in the United States appear less 
threatening. A war between great powers in today‘s world is very 
unlikely.
304
 
The United States is also unique in that it provides a number of public 
goods for the world.
305
 These include security guarantees, the protection of 
sea lanes, and support for open markets.
306
 After World War II, the United 
States forged a system of military alliances and transnational economic 
and political institutions—such as the United Nations, NATO, the 
 
 
 299. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, at x 
(2004) (observing that the U.S. occupies a different global position with respect to military, economic, 
and soft power).  
 300. See G. John Ikenberry, Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar 
Age, 30 REV. INT‘L STUD. 609, 618 (2004) [hereinafter Ikenberry, Liberalism]. 
 301. Potential rivals include China, Europe, Japan, and India. See ZAKARIA, POST-AMERICAN, 
supra note 297, at 21. 
 302. Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlforth, International Relations Theory and the Case 
Against Unilateralism, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 509, 511 (2005) [hereinafter Brooks & Wohlforth, 
Unilateralism]. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, Hard Times for Soft Balancing, 30 INT‘L 
SECURITY 72, 106 (2005). 
 305. Public goods are ―nonrivalrous,‖ which means capable of being simultaneously consumed by 
the provider and others, and ―nonexcludable,‖ which means impossible to keep others from 
consuming. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1236. 
 306. MANDELBAUM, supra note 33, at 34–62 (describing the public goods provided by the United 
States for the world). 
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International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank—that remain in place 
today.
307
 The United States exercises influence through these institutions 
and provides security for allies, such as Japan and Germany, by 
maintaining a strong military presence in Asia and Europe.
308
 Because of 
its overwhelming military might, the United States possesses what 
amounts to a ―quasi-monopoly‖ on the use of force.309 This prevents other 
nations from launching wars that would tend to be truly destabilizing for 
the international system. Similarly, the United States provides a public 
good through its efforts to combat terrorism and confront rogue states.
310
 
The United States does not produce these global public goods from 
altruism. As the largest consumer of these goods, it benefits from them the 
most. 
Of course, the United States supplies these public goods imperfectly. 
Pirates prey on shipping in some places (often with impunity), and rogue 
states continue to develop nuclear weapons.
311
 Depending on whether, and 
how much, U.S. power declines, its ability or willingness to provide these 
goods could one day be in doubt.
312
 Moreover, there are many important 
global public goods—such as addressing ―weakest link‖ collective action 
problems like climate change—that the United States cannot provide 
alone.
313
 Nonetheless, assessments of U.S. strategic interests—and the 
ability of ATS litigation to advance or hinder those interests—cannot rest 
on the assumption that the United States seeks to pursue its interests in the 
same way as other nations. America‘s unique role demands unique 
strategies.  
It should be clear that the ―realist‖ defense I offer here is not purely 
realist.
314
 To see how ATS litigation may be a net strategic benefit, one 
 
 
 307. See id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. See Ikenberry, Liberalism, supra note 300, at 618 (―The United States possesses a quasi-
monopoly on the international use of force while the domestic institutions and [behaviors] of states are 
increasingly open to global—that is, American—scrutiny.‖). 
 310. See, e.g., MANDELBAUM, supra note 33, at 163 (observing that forceful U.S. measures to 
prevent rogue states from acquiring nuclear weapons permitted Europe and China to adopt more 
conciliatory postures toward those regimes); see also TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 
144–61 (2004) (applying public-goods theory to the control of rogue states). 
 311. See RICHARD RHODES, THE TWILIGHT OF THE BOMBS: RECENT CHALLENGES, NEW 
DANGERS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS (2010); Milena Sterio, 
The Somali Piracy Problem: A Global Puzzle Necessitating a Global Solution, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 
1449, 1450 (2010). 
 312. See MANDELBAUM, supra note 33, at 62.  
 313. See generally Paul G. Harris, Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime 
Failure, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 195 (2007). 
 314. For a discussion of international relations realism, see supra notes 103–16 and accompanying 
text. 
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must accept that international law is not entirely epiphenomenal—that it 
does serve some purpose. Again, strict adherence to international relations 
neorealism seems to foreclose this possibility.
315
 However, no revisionist 
insists that neorealism in its pure form comprehensively describes all 
interactions among nations.
316
 One can accept the premise that 
international law qua international law exerts no independent pull on 
nations toward compliance, yet conclude that international law, including 
CIL, still serves strategic purposes.  
Suppose a state will, from time to time, restrain the exercise of its 
power in the short term in order to obtain greater long-term benefits. The 
larger a state‘s propensity to restrain short-term action in this way, the 
lower its ―discount rate.‖317 Because a tendency for self-restraint makes a 
state a better cooperative partner, low-discount-rate states will seek out 
other low-discount-rate states.
318
 How can states signal that they have a 
low discount rate? One way is through compliance with human rights 
norms. Because it involves only the state‘s treatment of its own citizens, a 
state suffers fewer sanctions for failing to comply with human rights 
norms than for failing to repay a debt or comply with a trade agreement. 
Because it does not tend to get much in return, compliance with human 
rights law is generally believed to be costlier for a state.
319
 For this reason, 
complying with human rights law can signal that the state is willing to 
engage in self-restraint and that it has a low discount rate.
320
  
Another way to look at the function of complying with human rights 
norms is through the lens of reputation.
321
 States are, at least to some 
degree, sensitive to their reputations. They may not value reputation above 
military or economic power, but reputation has some value, in part 
because it enables states to achieve other things. States can acquire 
reputations for a variety of things, from toughness to cooperativeness.
322
 
And a state will also develop a reputation regarding its compliance with 
 
 
 315. See supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. 
 316. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 39; see also GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 100, at 14 
(describing their approach to international relations as ―institutionalist‖). 
 317. See David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
879, 885–86 (2003). 
 318. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 100, at 172–74. 
 319. See Moore, supra note 317, at 886. 
 320. See Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 84–93 (2002); Moore, supra 
note 317, at 886. 
 321. See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic 
Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 674–75 (2001) (book review) (describing theories of signaling as a 
refinement of theories of reputation). 
 322. See generally Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State‟s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 231 
(2009). 
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international law.
323
 A single state‘s reputation will vary a great deal, 
depending on the states with whom its reputation is measured and the 
subject matter of interactions—such as trade, human rights, and the 
environment.
324
 Similarly, a state‘s reputation for complying with the law 
will vary with the type of international legal norm and nations with whom 
it has interacted.
325
 For example, the United States may have a strong 
reputation with Canada for complying with free trade agreements, but a 
somewhat weaker reputation for compliance with international human 
rights law.  
Why would states value a reputation for compliance with international 
human rights law? This brings us back to the signaling effect. It is 
generally in a state‘s interest, all other things being equal, to have a 
reputation for complying with international law because it signals it has 
characteristics that make it an appealing cooperative partner. A reputation 
for cooperativeness reduces the transaction costs for cooperation. 
It is also in a state‘s interest to signal cooperativeness in as cheap a way 
as possible. One of the ways to accomplish this is to influence the way 
norms are defined.
326
 ―A state that controls the signals that designate low-
discount types also obtains a degree of influence over the actions of other 
states. . . . [and] has the ability to select signals it can send more cheaply 
and that help it to identify countries that resemble itself.‖327 A nation that 
most influences the content of international human rights norms spends 
the fewest resources—and suffers the fewest sovereignty costs—in 
signaling cooperativeness through compliance with the human rights 
norms it has defined.  
Whether and how to signal cooperativeness through compliance with 
human rights norms presents a complex problem for the United States. As 
the sole superpower in a unipolar world and a provider of global public 
goods, the United States has the strength to get its way much of the time, 
whether or not it sends cooperative signals.
328
 For good or ill, no country 
 
 
 323. Guzman, Compliance Theory, supra note 116, at 1837. 
 324. See id. 
 325. See id. 
 326. This process of ―norm definition‖ is, for our realist purposes here, distinct from ―norm 
entrepreneurship,‖ the process described by nonrealists like Harold Koh by which norms are created 
and internalized by both nations and institutions. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, A United States 
Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 316 (2002). 
 327. Moore, supra note 317, at 892.  
 328. Andrew Moravcsik, Why Is U.S. Human Rights Policy So Unilateralist?, in 
MULTILATERALISM AND US FOREIGN POLICY 345, 347–49 (Stewart Patrick & Shepard Forman eds., 
2002) (citing geopolitical power as one reason for the United States‘ paradoxical approach toward 
international human rights); Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights, 
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can afford not to deal with the United States. In addition, because the 
United States has the greatest power to ignore external constraints, it bears 
the highest costs from complying with international human rights 
norms.
329
 This is why the United States often seeks to go its own way 
when it comes to human rights agreements.  
On the other hand, the United States must place a premium on 
cooperativeness because it is the provider of public goods. If other nations 
are cooperative, it can provide those public goods more cheaply. For 
example, it is much harder for the United States to operate military bases 
in nations where anti-American sentiment is higher.
330
 As the largest 
consumer of public goods, the United States benefits the most. Moreover, 
there are limits on even America‘s ability to disregard human rights norms 
without eventually acquiring a reputation for valuing short-term over long-
term interests, and jeopardizing its reputation for cooperativeness. For 
example, the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and the detention 
policies associated with Guantánamo harmed America‘s ―brand‖ and 
diminished support for U.S. policy abroad.
331
  
The United States, therefore, has three oft-conflicting incentives: it 
wants to shape the way in which cooperativeness is signaled through 
compliance with international law; it wants to signal cooperativeness itself 
to the extent that it can; and yet it wants to avoid the sovereignty costs 
from having to comply with human rights norms that are not part of its 
domestic law.  
One significant benefit of ATS litigation is that it makes it cheaper for 
the United States to signal that it is an appealing cooperative partner. ATS 
litigation helps the United States signal cooperativeness more cheaply in 
three ways. First, because actual litigation involving international human 
rights law is rare, many of the issues will be litigated for the first time 
 
 
International Criminal Justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775, 776–90, 831 
(2001) (detailing ways in which the United States has limited the applicability of international human 
rights law to itself even as it uses human rights to judge other nations). 
 329. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 21 (―The United States‘ political, economic, and military 
dominance of international politics; the unipolar structure of the international system; and the United 
States‘ capacity to comply with and enforce international law consistent with its interests suggests that 
the sovereignty cost of incorporating international law will be higher than the cost to any other State in 
the international system.‖). 
 330. See Ryan M. Scoville, A Sociological Approach to the Negotiation of Military Base 
Agreements, 14 U. MIAMI INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2006). 
 331. See STEPHEN HOLMES, THE MATADOR‘S CAPE: AMERICA‘S RECKLESS RESPONSE TO 
TERROR 152–53 (2007); Guantánamo‟s Shadow, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2007, ¶ 6, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/10/guantanamo-apos-s-shadow/6212/ (polling a 
bipartisan group of leading policy experts and finding 87% believed the U.S. detention system had hurt 
the fight against al Qaeda). 
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under the ATS. This gives the United States the opportunity to act as a 
―norm definer‖ with more influence over the development of that law.332 
Other nations or international law scholars may disagree with U.S. courts‘ 
interpretations of CIL norms in ATS cases, but these decisions doubtless 
exert some influence because they establish which international law norms 
can be enforced in the courts of the world‘s predominant power. Costs, in 
terms of signaling cooperativeness, increase for other nations who violate 
norms recognized in ATS litigation.
333
 Indeed, the desire to signal 
cooperativeness may account for other nations‘ surprisingly muted 
reactions to ATS litigation. The more closely international law 
corresponds to U.S. law, the lower the costs for the United States of 
compliance and signaling cooperativeness.
334
  
Second, as defenders of ATS litigation ruefully observe, sovereign 
immunity will protect U.S. officials from liability in most 
circumstances.
335
 To the extent foreign government officials are not 
similarly protected, this creates an unfair double standard, but also gives 
the U.S. government (if not its citizens) the advantage of defining norms 
while maintaining the flexibility of not adhering to those norms. In any 
event, U.S. citizens and corporations, including the private military 
contractors that do a great deal of national security work, are potentially 
subject to ATS liability.
336
 This imposes some compliance costs on the 
U.S., but also signals cooperativeness. If U.S. entities are going to be held 
liable for violations of CIL, it serves U.S. interests for claims to be heard 
in U.S. courts, with law defined by U.S. judges, rather than in alternative 
international fora.  
Third, ATS litigation expands the range of the signaling instrument. 
Just as the Washington administration relied on the federal courts to 
 
 
 332. See Moore, supra note 317, at 889–90. 
 333. For reasons discussed above, ATS litigation itself imposes few, if any, sovereignty costs on 
the United States. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 334. Cf. Abebe, supra note 4, at 25 (concluding that sovereignty costs from the incorporation of 
customary international law are high because it does not reflect state interests but is developed by elite 
opinion and nondemocratic processes).  
 335. See Karen Lin, Note, An Unintended Double Standard of Liability: The Effect of the Westfall 
Act on the Alien Tort Claims Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1718, 1720 (2008). It is disputed whether the 
universal jurisdiction associated with Sosa-threshold norms abrogates sovereign immunity for U.S. 
government officials. See Elizabeth A. Wilson, Is Torture All in a Day's Work? Scope of Employment, 
the Absolute Immunity Doctrine, and Human Rights Litigation Against U.S. Federal Officials, 6 
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 175, 244–45 (2008).  
 336. See In re Xe Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 592 (E.D. Va. 2009) (granting 
leave to amend ATS claims by Iraqi nationals against private security firm); Jenny S. Lam, 
Accountability for Private Military Contractors Under the Alien Tort Statute, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1459, 
1462 (2009). 
  
 
 
 
 
1172 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:1117 
 
 
 
 
resolve prize disputes between rival powers so that it could maintain a 
neutral posture, ATS litigation, by placing some power to interpret human 
rights norms with the judiciary, gives the executive branch the flexibility 
to send a different signal.
337
 When other nations understand the U.S. 
separation of powers, the executive branch can credibly distance itself 
from ATS litigation. The U.S. government as a whole can therefore signal 
both general cooperativeness through respect for, and even enforcement 
of, international human rights law and more specific cooperativeness via 
attention to the interests of the target nation. This ―multi-vocal‖ signaling 
enabled by the separation of powers expands the range of strategic options 
for signaling cooperativeness.
338
 
A major benefit of ATS litigation lies in its potential for addressing 
certain global collective action problems. The protection of human rights 
is not always a global public good because even massive human rights 
violations in one nation, such as the genocide in Rwanda, need not directly 
harm the citizens of other nations.
339
 However, to the extent that human 
rights violations cause consequences beyond borders—such as 
contributing to instability, spawning failed states, and increasing the flow 
of refugees—the threat of liability provides a global public good from 
which the United States benefits as a producer and consumer of global 
order. And there are other human rights violations that may pass the Sosa 
threshold and can truly be called interstate. Fighting piracy was a classic 
public good recognized as a paradigm in Sosa.
340
 While modern-day 
pirates are likely to have few assets, many organizations and persons who 
fund terrorism do have significant resources that can be reached through 
ATS lawsuits, complementing law enforcement and military efforts.
341
 
Terrorism is analogous to piracy in the way that it disrupts commerce, 
imposing costs on all nations, but especially on the United States.
342
  
 
 
 337. See generally Sloss, supra note 283.  
 338. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 145–51. 
 339. See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 
329–90 (2002) (showing how the United States, Western European governments, and the United 
Nations all chose not to intervene to prevent the Rwandan genocide in large part for this reason); 
McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1240–41.  
 340. 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2006). 
 341. See JIMMY GURULE, UNFUNDING TERROR 339–44 (2008); Beth Van Schaak, Finding the 
Tort of Terrorism in International Law, 28 REV. LITIG. 381, 385 (2008) (concluding that the tort of 
terrorism is ―precise, robust, and uncontroversial‖ enough to meet the Sosa threshold, and that 
recognizing the norm as ATS-actionable would ―bolster the United States‘ counter-terrorism regime 
by enabling a broader array of victims of acts of terror to pursue the assets of individuals and groups 
that finance or otherwise support acts of terrorism‖). 
 342. See generally THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS (Harry W. Richardson, 
Peter Gordon & James E. Moore II eds., 2006).  
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The second major benefit also relates to the cheapness of signaling, but 
looks to a future international system in which the United States is no 
longer the sole superpower.
343
 ATS jurisprudence influences the definition 
of CIL that will be used by global legal institutions like the International 
Criminal Court.
344
 These institutions are mechanisms through which the 
U.S. can exert an outsized influence in the international system after its 
relative power has declined.
345
 These global legal institutions may have 
some ―stickiness‖ in the sense that they provide a basis upon which 
nations can signal self-restraint. If the norms recognized by international 
institutions are closely aligned with U.S. law, emerging great powers—
such as China, India, and Brazil—will pay higher costs than the United 
States to signal cooperativeness through compliance with CIL. 
IV. WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ATS LITIGATION 
In the absence of comprehensive empirical evidence, efforts to weigh 
the costs and benefits of ATS litigation may seem like a quixotic task. But 
when mistaken revisionist assumptions are stripped away, the benefits of 
ATS litigation can be seen more clearly. It then becomes possible to 
construct a realist model under which ATS litigation is welfare-positive 
for the United States. Empirical studies can prove or disprove that model.  
In general, realism holds that nations do not act irrationally.
346
 Because 
it has persisted for decades, ATS litigation deserves the presumption of 
rationality. At the very least, we should begin by assuming that ATS 
litigation does not negatively impact U.S. interests. From that neutral 
standpoint, the costs and benefits can best be weighed.  
The optimal strategy for the United States should be to maximize the 
signaling effect of ATS litigation, while minimizing the risks of 
retaliation, or ―blowback.‖347 Where the target nation is another great 
power, the blowback for the United States is potentially at its zenith 
because the target nation will have the ability to retaliate. At the same 
time, the impact on the target nation will be small because ATS litigation 
is unlikely to result in disinvestment or alter human rights practices.
348
 
 
 
 343. See supra note 299 and accompanying text. 
 344. Cleveland, supra note 6, at 979. 
 345. See Ikenberry, China, supra note 212, at 13–14. 
 346. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text. 
 347. ―Blowback‖ originates from the intelligence context and generally refers to the unintended 
harmful consequences of government policies. See generally CHALMERS JOHNSON, BLOWBACK: THE 
COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2d ed. 2004). 
 348. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text.  
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China‘s market is so large that MNCs would be willing to pay some 
additional costs to do business there, and China, as a powerful state, faces 
less external pressure to comply with human rights norms.
349
 Conversely, 
where the target nation is not powerful, ATS lawsuits have a greater 
impact on the target country but less potential to cause blowback for the 
United States.
350
 ATS lawsuits are more likely to generate publicity and 
rally substantial support in smaller countries.
351
 And their governments are 
less able to retaliate against the United States.  
For the U.S. government as a whole, the optimal strategy is to manage 
ATS litigation so that it minimizes blowback while maximizing impact. 
Contrary to the warnings of revisionists, the history of ATS litigation thus 
far demonstrates that these are precisely the priorities that courts and even 
plaintiffs have followed, consciously or not, in ATS litigation. The 
lawsuits with the greatest potential for blowback involved events in China, 
which resulted in one declaratory judgment and a settlement by an 
MNC.
352
 Yet the China litigation has had no discernible effect on Sino-
American relations, nor has it caused U.S. companies to disinvest in China 
or discouraged Chinese companies from investing in the United States. 
The vast majority of ATS lawsuits have involved events and government 
officials in less powerful countries.
353
 Those ending in judgments for the 
plaintiffs or settlements have almost all involved nations in Latin America 
and Africa.
354
  
Nor is ATS litigation likely to impose significant sovereignty costs. 
There is very little risk that a court would enforce a norm not already part 
of U.S. domestic law.
355
 The oft-cited examples of international law 
conflicting with U.S. law include norms prohibiting the death penalty and 
religious blasphemy.
356
 But it is very hard to see how these norms could be 
regarded as universal, specific, and obligatory—and ATS actionable—
when they are controversial in the United States.
357
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In general, the sovereignty and foreign policy costs from ATS litigation 
are outweighed by its positive signaling effects. These effects can be seen, 
not only in the generally positive response it has received among the 
populations of target countries, but in the muted response by U.S. allies 
and other governments.
358
 With a handful of notable exceptions, foreign 
governments have rarely voiced their opposition to the lawsuits in 
public.
359
 In fact, the most consistent objections to ATS litigation have 
come from the executive branch of the U.S. government.
360
 It is logical to 
assume from this that other nations have calculated that the costs of ATS 
litigation are outweighed by its benefits. Like the United States, other 
nations benefit from signaling cooperativeness through compliance with 
human rights norms. ATS litigation actually enables cheaper signaling for 
them as well because the target nations do not have to pay the often high 
costs of bringing human rights violators to justice. Where offenders are 
former government officials, prosecutions or civil liability can be very 
difficult for political reasons. And MNC defendants may possess a great 
deal of economic leverage over target countries.  
Because there is a high bar for success in ATS litigation, there is little 
chance that it can become an all-purpose tool for addressing global 
problems. Although its costs are quite small in terms of diplomatic friction 
and blowback, its strategic benefits through signaling are also likely to 
remain small. Despite its popularity with international and U.S. foreign 
affairs law scholars, ATS litigation plays a minor role in the vast array of 
relationships the United States has with the rest of the world. It is but one 
of many signals—positive and negative—the United States sends 
regarding its willingness to comply with international law.  
This does not mean, however, that ATS litigation is not important. 
While its global impact may be modest, its effect on those involved can be 
quite profound.
361
 For some victims of human rights abuses, it offers the 
only means of redress or, at the very least, the prospect of serious publicity 
about the perpetrators‘ crimes. Were its costs and benefits evenly 
balanced, ATS litigation would deserve to continue for this reason alone.  
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CONCLUSION 
Mysterious and unique, the ATS has generated a rich scholarly 
literature and a fierce debate—in- and outside academia—since its 1980 
revival.
362
 Where does it come from, and what was its purpose? Text, 
structure, and history have been deeply explored, yielding little, if any, 
consensus.
363
 But lurking in the background are more important questions: 
what purpose should ATS litigation serve, and what effect does it have for 
the United States in the twenty-first century? This parallel, pragmatic 
debate has never been fully engaged because the ATS‘s critics and 
defenders cannot agree on the fundamentals of geopolitics.
364
 Lacking 
common ground, the two sides talk past one another, their diverse 
assumptions apparently dictating their conclusions about the ATS‘s costs 
and benefits. 
But there is a way beyond this impasse. Critics and defenders alike 
should consider whether their conclusions are justified, even under 
alternative paradigms of international relations. For example, if liberalist 
insights that democratic nations cooperate more easily are correct, is the 
ATS nonetheless a counterproductive means of achieving cooperation 
regarding human rights because it interferes with efforts by international 
legal institutions to develop human rights law? Such questions should be 
explored. 
Likewise, the ATS‘s critics ought to consider whether a realist 
assessment of costs and benefits actually supports ATS litigation in its 
current form. The ATS functions as a much more precise and controllable 
foreign policy instrument than its critics give it credit for. ATS litigation 
not only furthers the stated U.S. foreign policy goal of promoting human 
rights worldwide, but it also advances the United States‘ core security and 
economic interests. As the leading power and global provider of public 
goods, the United States benefits when it cheaply signals, via the ATS, 
support for human rights law. At the same time, the articulation and 
development of certain core CIL norms by U.S. courts will give the United 
States a crucial advantage, even in a multipolar world. 
 
 
 362. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra note 1. 
 364. See supra Part I. 
 
